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INTRODUCTION
N the vision of law that dominates economics-influenced legal
theory, law imposes sanctions to solve problems of cooperation.
On this view, the problem to be solved is the absence of coopera-
tion and the solution law provides is the imposition of sanctions.
Both parts of this story are compelling. The need for cooperation is
pervasive; individuals often act in ways that benefit themselves but
prevent a larger group from achieving its best outcome. Sanctions
are powerful; by imposing liability or punishment on individuals, the
state changes the payoffs so that cooperation rather than defection is
the dominant strategy. Given the focus on sanctions, it is inevitable
that a concern for deterrence dominates the economic analysis of le-
gal rules. Except for some attention to the incapacitation function of
certain criminal sanctions, economists overwhelmingly assume that
law matters solely because state-imposed legal sanctions generate de-
terrence. To be sure, the ultimate effects of the sanctions are
complex and much of law and economics addresses their secondary
or tertiary consequences. But the analysis almost always assumes
the first step in the causal chain by which law affects individual be-
havior is that the formal sanctions law imposes raise or lower the
costs of a behavior.
Some legal theorists challenge this dominant view by emphasiz-
ing features of law other than its sanctions. These theorists claim
that, in addition to its sanction function, law has an "expressive"
function.! The thesis is that law influences behavior independent of
'See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's
Expressive Function, 49 Syracuse L. Rev. 1039 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights
Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J.
1650 [Vol. 86:1649
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the sanctions it threatens to impose, that law works by what it says
in addition to what it does.2 Even this literature, however, mostly
accepts the dominant view of the problem that law solves-that of
cooperation. Without criticizing that approach, in this Article I
pursue a different path. To explain one means by which law works
expressively, I focus on a different problem of strategic interaction:
not cooperation but coordination. Specifically, I claim that law pro-
vides a focal point around which individuals can coordinate their
behavior. When individuals have a common interest in coor-
dinating, as frequently occurs, a legal rule may guide behavior
merely by influencing expectations about how others will behave
Legal Stud. 725, 725-26 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of
Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2022 (1996); Janice Nadler, The Effects of
Perceived Injustice on Deference to the Law (Feb. 23, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). For a more formal,
economic account, see Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An
Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577, 1593-94 (2000)
[hereinafter, Cooter, Good Laws]; Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27
J. Legal Stud. 585,653 (1998) [hereinafter, Cooter, Expressive Law].
"By "expressive function of law" and (for short) "expressive law," I refer to the
positive claim that law influences behavior independently of its sanctions. A separate
literature addresses the different "expressivist" claim that law has a normative value
based on what it expresses, independent of its consequences. See, e.g., Matthew D.
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363
(2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic
Meaning, Nonlinguistic 'Expression' and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A
Reply to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1577 (2000).
3To my knowledge, only three theorists have explored or are exploring
coordination as a basis for the expressive effect of law. Eric Posner once noted that
"[liegislatures can create focal points... with which actors can coordinate their
behavior." Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1697, 1719 (1996) [hereinafter, Posner, Inefficient Norms]. He did not elaborate
the point and, in any event, he was not claiming that the effect arose independent of
legal sanctions. (His one example was recording statutes for property, which appear
to function because the state ultimately backs its property judgments by force.)
However, Posner is now developing a constitutional theory under which the U.S.
Supreme Court influences behavior expressively by first establishing a reputation for
predicting behavioral change. See Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Constitutions(Feb. 28, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association) [hereinafter, Posner, Evolution of Constitutions]. In this regard, he
pursues the suggestion, first made by David Strauss, that a written constitution may
serve as a focal point for coordinating behavior. See David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 910-19 (1996). Finally, Robert
Cooter briefly notes that state officials might use unenforced "pronouncements" to
shift social behavior from one equilibrium to another, assuming the officials enjoy a
reputation for predicting future behavior. See Cooter, Good Laws, supra note 1, at
27-28. None of these accounts duplicates my own, which emphasizes the features of
law that are likely to make a particular outcome psychologically salient or "focal." In
particular, my claim does not depend upon any governmental official developing a
HeinOnline  -- 86 Va. L. Rev.  1651 2000
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The point is most clearly made in the situation of a pure coordi-
nation game, a simple example of which is the choice of whether to
drive on the left or right side of the road. If no convention cur-
rently guides drivers on this decision and, consequently, they
expect many accidents, the state might create a convention merely
by announcing it. A legal proclamation-"Drive on the right"-
even one that carries no threat of sanctions, may cause people to
drive on the right just because the proclamation makes everyone
expect that others will drive on the right. The central issue, of
course, is why a sanctionless proclamation would cause people to
change their expectations of what others will do. As I will show,
when people are otherwise at a loss for how to coordinate, it takes
surprisingly little to guide expectations and behavior. Once expec-
tations are changed, the coordination problem is solved: A driver
who expects others to drive on the right will almost always prefer
to drive on the right as well. The state can thus change behavior by
changing expectations; self-interest does the rest.
Generalizing this simple example requires two critical moves.
First, I must demonstrate that the focal point theory applies out-
side of pure coordination games. Most of social life does not
involve situations where the parties care only about coordinating
and are utterly indifferent to how they coordinate. Yet even
though pure coordination games are rare, a great many social situa-
tions involve an element of coordination, where the parties jointly
wish to avoid certain outcomes. As it turns out, the law can still
guide expectations in these situations, with the same result that the
law affects behavior by what it expresses. Second, I must demon-
strate that the focal point theory applies not only to simple "one-
shot" games, but to iterated situations where individuals have a
chance to coordinate without the guidance of law. One would not
expect, for example, that drivers would fail to coordinate indefi-
nitely, but that they would eventually stumble upon a convention
of driving on a particular side of the road, even if the government
never expressed anything about the matter. As it turns out, the ex-
istence of spontaneous order of this sort does not render expressive
law superfluous. Independent of sanctions, law can both cause in-
dividuals to converge on a particular convention more quickly than
reputation for accurately predicting future behavior, though that would certainly
enhance the mechanism I describe. See infra text accompanying note 55.
1652 [Vol. 86:1649
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they otherwise would and upset the conventions that have already
emerged.
I make these claims in four parts. Part I will introduce the prob-
lem of coordination and the idea of a focal point. It will then show
how law could provide a focal point in a pure coordination game.
By making a particular means of coordinating salient or prominent,
the law can increase the probability that individuals use that
means. Part II will broaden the analysis to include not merely pure
coordination games, but "mixed-motive" games that involve both
coordination and conflict. This Part will demonstrate that by pro-
viding a focal point, adjudication and regulation can influence
behavior in these common situations. Part III will then introduce a
dynamic setting in which an equilibrium outcome evolves over
time. In this context, law additionally changes behavior by labeling
or clarifying certain features of the strategic environment. Part IV
will illustrate the analysis with the examples of antismoking laws
and landlord/tenant disputes.
In several ways, the analysis in this Article is highly preliminary.
Some caveats are therefore in order. First, I do not claim that the
expressive function of law is more important than the sanction
function, only that we should not emphasize the latter to the point
that we utterly ignore the former. Second, I do not claim that the
focal point theory explains the entire expressive function of law.
Others have illuminated the matter greatly, and elsewhere I offer
an entirely different explanation for how the law influences behav-
ior independent of its sanction-that law signals information law-
makers hold about the costs and benefits of the behavior being
regulated Given that most law and economics theorists now con-
centrate entirely on the sanctions that law imposes, it is too early to
consider which of these expressive theories is the most important.
Third, like all expressive law theories, the focal point model re-
4 See sources cited supra notes 1, 3.
5See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Law's Expressive Function,
79 Or. L. Rev. - (forthcoming 2000) (contending that legislation and judicial
opinions may change behavior by signaling information about public approval or
disapproval of the regulated behavior); Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H.
McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A
Theory of Informative Law 2-5 (Apr. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association) (contending that legislation may change behavior
by signaling information about the risk or effectiveness of the regulated behavior).
2000] 1653
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quires empirical testing. Below, I review the relevant experiments,
but because they do not specifically address law, their support for
the claims I make remains indirect and speculative. At this stage,
my goal is to show that the focal effects are plausible and to define
the model precisely enough to facilitate empirical testing. Fourth,
the focal effects I discuss in this Article are not all unique to law. In
some cases, as I will note below, private individuals and institutions
create focal points and can therefore supply the same expressive
force as the state can through law. Because my primary aim is just
to establish the focal point power, thereby showing an effect of le-
gal rules other than deterrence, I only sporadically address the
issue whether government or private institutions have a compara-
tive expressive advantage in any particular circumstance. Finally,
although I rely on numerous game theory concepts, my analysis is
mostly informal. No doubt some additional benefit can be provided
by precisely modeling each claim, but I leave that for later research.
My aim here is to interest others in exploring the implications of fo-
cal point theory for law.
I. COORDINATION GAMES AND FOCAL POINTS
This Part will explain how law can influence behavior by serving
as a focal point in simple games of pure coordination. Section A
will introduce the game theory concept of a coordination problem.
Section B will describe the power of "focal points" to solve such
problems. Section C will explain how legal rules can create focal
points, thus solving coordination games without the threat of sanc-
tions.
A. Coordination Problems
Much of social and legal theory focuses on problems of coopera-
tion.6 The central metaphor of this work is the prisoner's dilemma
game.' In such games, not cooperating is the dominant strategy;
each prisoner, for example, is better off confessing no matter what
6See, e.g., Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (1991);
Russell Hardin, Collective Action (1982); Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965); Elinor Ostrom, Governing
the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990).
7See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 3-24 (1984); Edna
Ulmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms 18-73 (1977).
[Vol. 86:16491654
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the other prisoner does. But another pervasive problem for social
interaction is coordination.8 In a coordination game, players have
common interests, but this fact does not guarantee that the players
will do the best they can for themselves. To illustrate the coordina-
tion problem, consider a variation of the prisoner's dilemma. In the
standard scenario, the prosecutor separates two suspects and offers
each a deal for confessing that makes it best to be the only one to
confess and worst to be the only one not to confess. Imagine in-
stead that a prosecutor separates two guilty prisoners and offers
each of them this deal: "If you give the same alibi as the other sus-
pect, I will believe you both and set you both free; but if you give
no alibi or different alibis, you go to prison." The suspects now
have perfectly common interests: They both want to give the same
alibi. But if they haven't discussed their alibis in advance, they may
go to jail. They may fail to coordinate.
The need for coordination is pervasive. Two rowers of a boat
who share an interest in maximizing speed or efficiency will wish to
coordinate the timing of their oar strokes.9 Two hunters who share
an interest in killing a prey that can be caught only by concerted
action will wish to coordinate their pursuit." Two people who seek
to communicate will wish to coordinate on the meaning of the
sounds or symbols they use; they need to speak "the same" lan-
guage.11 A group of people who want to buy and sell commodities
need to coordinate on a system of measurement and a medium of
exchange."
8See Russell W. Cooper, Coordination Games: Complementaries and Macro-
economics (1999); Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 7, at 74-133; Steven Hetcher,
Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 42-55 (1999);
Robert Sugden, Conventions, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the
Law 453-60 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Colin Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory:
Experiments on Strategic Interaction, at ch. 7 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association). For a summary of the experimental literature
on coordination games, see Jack Ochs, Coordination Problems, in The Handbook of
Experimental Economics 195 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
, See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 315 (David Fate Norton & Mary J.
Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739).
10e Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of
Inequality Among Men, in The Social Contract and the Discourses 87 (G.D.H. Cole
trans., David Campell Publishers 1993) (1755). His example gives rise to a
coordination game known as the "stag hunt." See Sugden, supra note 8, at 457-58.
11 See Hume, supra note 9, at 315; David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study
(1969).USee Hume, supra note 9, at 490.
2000] 1655
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A final example-and perhaps the central metaphor in the coor-
dination literature-is the meeting-place problem, where two
people have a common interest in meeting each other but lack the
ability to communicate about where to meet."3 For concreteness,
suppose that two people shopping together in a department store
are accidentally separated. The two lost individuals share an inter-
est in finding each other, yet they have not agreed in advance on a
meeting place and they cannot now communicate with each other.
The matrix in Figure 1 (adapted from David Lewis14) describes
such a game involving two players and, for simplicity, three possi-
ble meeting places. One player-R (Row-chooser)-can play
strategies RI, R2, or R3, which consist of going to places P1, P2, or
P3, representing (say) the mall entrance of the store on the first,
second, and third floors, respectively. The other player-C (Col-
umn-chooser)--can play strategies Ci, C2, and C3, which consist of
going to the same three places, respectively. The players choose
their strategies simultaneously, not being able to observe what the
other is doing. Each receives more utility from meeting (1) than
from not meeting (0)."5 Each player therefore has an interest (equal
in this example) in coordinating his or her action with that of the
other player.
Cl C2 C3
Ri 1,1 0,0 0,0
R2 0,0 1,1 0,0
R3 0,0 0,0 1,1
FIGURE1
The problem with coordination is captured by the fact that this
game has multiple equilibria and there is no simple way of choos-
ing between them. Obviously, R wants to coordinate by playing Ri
(going to P1) if C plays Ci (goes to P1), R2 if C plays C2, and R3 if
C plays C3. C wants to play Ci if R plays Ri, C2 if R plays R2, and
C3 if R plays R3. Together, these observations identify three pure-
strategy Nash equilibria, outcomes in which no one player can gain
13 See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 54-55 (1963).
14 See Lewis, supra note 11, at 9.
"-,The first number in each cell represents the utility of Row-chooser; the second
states the utility of Column-chooser.
[Vol. 86:16491656
HeinOnline  -- 86 Va. L. Rev.  1656 2000
Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law
by changing his or her strategy: RI/Cl, R2/C2, and R3/C3.6 There
are also mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, such as where R and C
each have a one-third probability of going to each of the three
places.
Solving cooperation problems requires a change in payoffs. Solv-
ing coordination problems, however, just requires the right kind of
expectations. In the example, each player needs to expect the other
to go to the same place. For example, if R expects C to go to P1
and, likewise, C expects R to go to P1, then the two players will co-
ordinate. Once the expectations are aligned, there is no difficulty
"solving" the game and achieving what is the best outcome for
both players.
What will suffice to create these expectations? Below, I will ar-
gue that various forms of third-party communication can, as an
empirical matter, create the necessary expectations and solve the
game. From a rational perspective, however, something close to
"common knowledge" is required, although it is difficult in a short
space to say precisely what. To see the problem, consider what is
necessary to make R rationally expect that C will go to P1. Given
the meeting place incentives, it may seem that R will not rationally
expect to meet C at P1 unless R believes that C expects to meet R
there. The same is true for C. Therefore, it appears we need sec-
ond-order expectations: R expects C to expect R to go to P1 and,
likewise, C expects R to expect C to go to P1. But the same logic
would require third-order expectations to make the second-order
expectations rational. For R, that means R expects C to expect R to
go to P because R expects C to expect R to expect C to go to P1.
And so on. David Lewis defines the infinite set of beliefs as com-
mon knowledge.' Common knowledge of a fact x means that
everyone in the relevant population believes x, believes that every-
one believes x, believes that everyone believes that everyone
believes x, and so on, ad infinitum."
Something less than this strict form of common knowledge,
however, should suffice to solve the game. We can relax the defini-
16 For example, Ri is the best response R can make to C1 and that same strategy-
Cl-is the best response C can make to RI. Thus, given Ri/Cl, neither player would
want to switch strategies unilaterally. The same is true for R2/C2 and R3/C3.
17 See Lewis, supra note 11, at 52-60.
18 See id.
2000] 1657
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tion at least to account for the fact that individuals cannot con-
sciously reason through an infinite number of steps before solving
a coordination problem. It should be sufficient that the individuals
have the lower order expectation and some reason to believe that
the higher order expectations exist, whether or not they actually
believe they exist. 9 We may be able to relax the common knowl-
edge requirement further, but in any event we need not fully
resolve the matter to begin creating a focal point theory of expres-
sive law.
B. Solving Coordination Games: Focal Points
What can produce the aligned expectations? One possibility is
communication. The communication most frequently studied is
that between the players in the game. When the parties can com-
municate, experiments show that their "cheap talk" facilitates
coordination.' Suppose, however, the parties cannot communicate
with each other, as is true when people are unexpectedly separated
without having agreed in advance for such a contingency. One
might think that individuals in this situation can solve the coordina-
tion problem only by chance. In our meeting place example, with
three possible meeting places, that would mean the parties find
each other only one-third of the time. The problem is severe when
there is a very large number of places where the individuals could
potentially meet. The odds of meeting seem vanishingly small.
19 One can have a reason to believe something but, because one hasn't thought
about it, not actually have formed the belief. A standard example is arithmetic: One
may have reason to believe that 48 times 24 equals 1152 before one actually believes it.
One has a reason because one believes in a multiplication method that produces that
result. But before one actually performs the calculation, one does not have an actual
subjective belief. Thus, some external signal might give R and C reason to believe all
the higher-order expectations, but R and C only reason to the first-order (or first few
orders of) expectation. So we could define common knowledge by substituting "has
reason to believe" for "believes" in every case it is used in the prior paragraph.
In game theory, talk or communication is "cheap" when it is "costless,
nonbinding, and nonverifiable." Douglas G. Baird, et al., Game Theory and the Law
303 (1994). Exactly how "cheap talk" facilitates coordination is a matter of some
dispute. See Vincent Crawford, A Survey of Experiments on Communication via
Cheap Talk, 78 J. Econ. Theory 286 (1998). But note that communication in the pure
coordination game is not plagued by the incentive to lie that exists in cooperation
problems like the prisoner's dilemma. If R and C want to meet and are indifferent to
where they meet, neither has a reason to misrepresent his intentions.
1658 [Vol. 86:1649
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One of the fundamental insights of Thomas Schelling's classic
The Strategy of Conflice' is that, in exactly these sorts of situations,
people manage to coordinate much better than chance alone would
indicate. They do so by what he terms the "tacit coordination" that
arises when parties attempt to imagine what the other is thinking
about how to solve the problem.'
It is likely that each will think of some obvious place to meet, so
obvious that each will be sure that the other is sure that it is
"obvious" to both of them. One does not simply predict where
the other will go, since the other will go where he predicts the
first to go, which is wherever the first predicts the second to
predict the first to go, and so [on] ad infinitum.... What is nec-
essary is to coordinate predictions, to read the same message in
the common situation, to identify the one course of action that
their expectations of each other can converge on. They must
"mutually recognize" some unique signal that coordinates their
expectations of each other.'
Specifically, Schelling proposes that, when the problem is select-
ing one means of coordinating among many, certain solutions stand
out from the others as the sort that will attract the attention of
both. He called these special solutions focal points:
Most situations.., provide some clue for coordinating behav-
ior, some focal point for each person's expectation of what the
other expects him to expect to be expected to do. Finding the
key, or rather finding a key-any key that is mutually recog-
nized as the key becomes the key-may depend on imagination
more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, acciden-
tal arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration,
casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know
about each other. Whimsy may send [two parties separated in a
department store] to the "lost and found"; or logic may lead
each to reflect and to expect the other to reflect on where they
would have agreed to meet if they had had a prior agreement to
cover the contingency. It is not being asserted that they will al-
ways find an obvious answer to the question; but the chances of
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their doing so are ever so much greater than the bare logic of
abstract random probabilities would ever suggest.24
Because focal points do not depend entirely on a priori reason-
ing, Schelling contends that "[t]his corner of game theory"-
coordination--"is inherently dependent on empirical evidence. '
Following his own advice, Schelling provides some (relatively in-
formal) experimental data to support his claim that people
coordinate more successfully in these situations than chance would
indicate. For example, he asked people where and at what time of
day they would meet someone in New York City, absent prior ar-
rangement. Given the extremely high number of possible equilibria,
random selection would produce a very low probability of coordina-
tion. Yet over half selected the same place-Grand Central
Station-and almost all selected the same time-noon. 6 Similarly,
Schelling asked people to imagine they were paratroopers who
needed to meet another paratrooper knowing only that each
landed somewhere in an area represented in a map given to each.
When there was a unique feature on the map-a single bridge,
crossroads, or house-the subjects generally coordinated by select-
ing that spot.7
Focal points matter to all coordination games, not just the meet-
ing-place problem. For example, Schelling asked subjects to select
"heads" or "tails" with the goal of matching one's partner's selec-
tion, a problem in which a random selection will match 50% of the
time. Yet 86% selected "heads." When asked to name the same
positive number as one's partner-where the potential equilibria
2,Id. at 57. For reasons discussed below, Schelling believed that focal points were of
fundamental importance, not just to coordination games, but to larger issues of game
theory. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Philosopher David Lewis uses
the focal point idea in his analysis of conventions. His term is salience, by which he
refers to the psychological prominence of certain coordination solutions. See Lewis,
supra note 11, at 35-36.
25 Schelling, supra note 13, at 98. Schelling states:
[A] normative theory of games, a theory of strategy, depending on intellectual
coordination, has a component that is inherently empirical; it depends on how
people can coordinate their expectations. It depends therefore on skill and on
context. The rational player must address himself to the empirical question of
how, in the particular context of his own game, two rational players might
achieve tacit coordination of choices, if he is to find in the game a basis for
sharing an a priori expectation of the outcome with his partner.
Id. at 285.
"See id. at 55 n.1, 56.
" See id. at 54-55,58.
1660 [Vol. 86:1649
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are infinite and random matching would produce almost no coor-
dination--40% of the subjects selected the same number: 1.
Schelling posed a similarly daunting question by asking the subjects
to name an amount of money with the (imagined) prospect of win-
ning that amount if it matched the partner's selection. Yet 29%
coordinated at the same number, though interestingly, a much lar-
ger one than in the prior game: 1,000,000. Not surprisingly, more
formal experiments have confirmed the basic point that people are
able to coordinate by identifying certain solutions as ones that oth-
ers will recognize as being particularly prominent.'
The experiments confirm what is familiar: Absent communica-
tion, individuals often coordinate at points that, in some sense,
"stick out" from the others. Sometimes there is a logic to deciding
what solution has this unique property. But often the uniqueness
obviously depends on the experiences and contingent associations
of the individuals involved. In the prior examples, "heads" is not
logically prior to "fails" and Grand Central Station is not logically
prior to the Empire State Building (or any other place in New
York). But people are often able to predict, if they know enough
about the other people and their experiences, what those others
will perceive as prominent or salient. The people in Schelling's
original experiment, for example, were all living in New Haven,
and therefore imagined that Grand Central Station was the most
prominent place in New York common to the entire group. 9 We
can now see why Schelling said that success at coordinating de-
pends on contextual factors, on the "symbolic or connotative
characteristics that transcend the mathematical structure of the
2 See Michael Bacharach & Michele Bernasconi, The Variable Frame Theory of
Focal Points: An Experimental Study, 19 Games & Econ. Behav. 1, 37-39 (1997);
Judith Mehta et al., An Experimental Investigation of Focal Points in Coordination
and Bargaining: Some Preliminary Results, in Decision Making Under Risk and
Uncertainty: New Models and Empirical Findings 211, 216 (John Geweke ed., 1992)
[hereinafter Mehta et al., Experimental Investigation]; Judith Mehta, et al., Focal
Points in Pure Coordination Games: An Experimental Investigation, 36 Theory and
Decision 163 (1994); Judith Mehta et al., The Nature of Salience: An Experimental
Investigation of Pure Coordination Games, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 658, 672 (1994)
[hereinafter Mehta et al., The Nature of Salience].
"Similarly, heads is prior to tails in experience, if only the experience that people
usually say "heads or tails" rather than "tails or heads." Schelling gives another
example: "Ordinary folk lost on a plane circular area may naturally go to the center to
meet each other; but only one versed in mathematics would 'naturally' expect to meet
his partner at the center of gravity of an irregularly shaped area." Schelling, supra
note 13, at 58.
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game"' and are often excluded from the theorist's description of
the game.31
One of the recent experiments illuminates the reasoning process
involved. 2 Researchers asked the subjects for a series of responses,
including the name of a flower.3 They told 88 subjects that they
should answer however they wished and that their payoff would
not depend on the answers; another 90 were told that their payoff
for the experiment would rise if they matched the selection of an
anonymous partner who was given the same goal. The most com-
mon answer to both groups was "rose," but the number giving that
answer increased from 35.2% in the first group to 66.7% in the
second group.' These results show that conscious reasoning is in-
volved in identifying a focal point. The first percentage shows that
the subjects' experiences and associations made "rose" more likely
to "pop" into their head than any other flower, but still less likely
than not. The second percentage shows that, whatever pops into
one's head, people can reason about what answers others are likely
to give.35 Many subjects who think of a different flower nonetheless
realize that most others will think of a rose, and because most oth-
ers will recognize "rose" as the most likely response, there is a
reason to switch to that answer rather than to expect others to
switch to something else. Reasoning about the focal point substan-
tially increases coordination.
There is a difficult issue lurking here: Even after one takes ac-
count of contextual factors, can rationality fully explain why some
solutions "stick out" from others? Or, alternatively, are some
points prominent or salient only because of certain irrational fea-
30 Id. at 96.
31Dixit and Skeath note that the messiness and uncertainty of focal points still
bother many game theorists "who would prefer the outcome to depend only on an
abstract specification of a game." Avinash Dixit & Susan Skeath, Games of Strategy
213 (1999). They disagree: "We think that historical and cultural contexts are just as
important to a game as its purely mathematical description, and if such context helps
in selecting a unique outcome from multiple Nash equilibria, that is all to the better."
Id.
32 See Mehta et al., The Nature of Salience, supra note 28.
33 See id. at 662-63.
4 See id. at 667.
31 Although both groups outperformed random selection, in 19 of 20 questions
asked, including the "flower" question, the group attempting to coordinate matched
each others' answers significantly more often than the group not consciously
attempting to coordinate. See id. at 667-69.
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tures of human psychology? Schelling thought that success at coor-
dinating may depend "more on imagination than on logic, more on
poetry or humour than on mathematics."36 On the other hand,
some theorists have attempted to reduce focal points to pure ra-
tionality, thereby allowing a formal model of the focal point
influence on equilibrium selection.' For my purposes, it is not nec-
essary to resolve this issue. Even if what makes a solution focal is
not fully rational, it is sufficient for my claim that we can predict
and manipulate what individuals will recognize as focal. Experi-
mental studies and real world observation provide great insight
into focal points, and tend to support my claim that law, like other
third-party communication, makes certain solutions focal. In the
end, it is an empirical claim. 8
C. A First Pass at an Expressive Theory: Using Law to Create
Focal Points in Pure Coordination Games
Strangely, there has been no significant effort to apply the focal
point idea systematically to law. My claim is that law is one means
of creating a focal point, and therefore, one means of achieving co-
ordination. Even without threatening sanctions, the state can focus
attention on one of several equilibrium solutions to a coordination
game by commanding or merely recommending that individuals
coordinate around that solution. Any third-party expression may
facilitate coordination in this manner, but law has several features
that make it particularly suitable for this purpose.
36 Schelling, supra note 13, at 97. See also Sanjeev Goyal & Maarten Janssen, Can
We Rationally Learn to Coordinate?, 40 Theory & Decision 29 (1996) (arguing that
rationality and common knowledge are not sufficient to explain how individuals
manage to coordinate behavior in repeated games); Robert Sugden, The Role of
Inductive Reasoning in the Evolution of Conventions, 17 Law & Phil. 377 (1998)
(same).
31 See Bacharach & Bernasconi, supra note 28, at 1-2; Andrew M. Colman, Salience
and Focusing in Pure Coordination Games, 4 J. Econ. Methodology 61, 61 (1997);
Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 Econ. J. 533, 534-35, 550 (1995). Of
course, I read Sugden, supra note 36, to show that he does not believe his prior paper
succeeds in fully explaining the perception of a focal point via rationality.
" One may wonder whether I am giving a "rational choice" account of the
expressive function. I believe I am because, as the "rose" experiments show,
individuals are rationally exploiting features of their environment, even if the
perceptions of those features are not themselves determined solely by rationality.
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1. Creating a Focal Point by Third-Party Communication
Third-party communication is a potential means of creating a fo-
cal point for coordination. Consider again the meeting-place
problem where R and C are accidentally separated in a department
store. Schelling notes that one way of providing a focal point would
be a conspicuous sign stating, "The management suggests that all
persons who become separated meet each other at the information
booth in the center of the ground floor."39 It is easy to imagine this
sign would solve the coordination problem even though R and C
have not agreed in advance to follow the suggestions of any signs
they see. Indeed, a third-party communication might work even
though it is not intended by the speaker as a means of coordinat-
ing. Suppose R and C are separated, not in a department store, but
in a town. Suppose each also knows that the other reads the town's
daily paper each morning and, on the day in which the meeting
problem occurs, each observes a front page story about place num-
ber two-P2 (and no story about P1 or P3). We can easily imagine
that this fact would cause R and C to go to P2, if not with certainty,
then at least with more than the random probability of one-third.
Third-party communication can work because R and C each
have common knowledge (in at least the weak sense I described
above) that they have received one and only one message from a
third party that refers to one and only one of the potential solu-
tions. In the absence of some other factor that highlights a different
solution, the third-party message provides a focal point that will
tend to induce coordination on the solution it mentions. Note also
that there is no additional requirement about the third party. R and
C need not believe the newspaper possesses any particular good
qualities, including "moral authority," nor believe in the truth or
"legitimacy" of the newspaper's story on P2. As Schelling notes,
"Beggars cannot be choosers about the source of their signal, or
about its attractiveness compared with others that they can only
wish were as conspicuous.""
Two recent experiments confirm Schelling's intuition. In one,
experimenters themselves provided the message, suggesting that
39 Schelling, supra note 13, at 66.
40 Id.
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the players coordinate at a particular equilibrium." In a two-person
pure coordination game with three possible equilibria (and no pay-
off-dominant solution), the experimenters' message raised the level
of coordination from 40% to 98%.42 In a second experiment, ex-
perimenters allowed one of the parties in a four-person pure
coordination game to signal separately to each other player a
choice that he might then make in the game.43 When this randomly
selected "leader" had the same incentives as the other players, his
"cheap talk" signal raised coordination levels from 17.8% to
78.9%."
In these experiments, the players each could take one of three
actions. There is a potential problem in extending these studies to
coordination games with only two Nash equilibria.45 Suppose a
meeting-place problem in which P1 and P2 are the only options. If
the newspaper mentions P2 on the front page, that would seem to
make P2 focal; it is the only meeting place that is mentioned. But it
also arguably makes P1 focal because it is the only meeting place
that is not mentioned. This problem does not arise when there is
more than one meeting place not mentioned, because, in that case,
the newspaper story can only make the mentioned meeting place
salient. But, in the case of two Nash equilibria, it is not clear why
rationality should dictate choosing the one mentioned place over
the one place not mentioned.
As previously stated, however, I am not concerned with using ra-
tionality alone to explain what is focal. Perhaps there is a
psychological explanation for why mentioned items are more sali-
ent than those not mentioned. What matters is the empirical claim
that mentioning an item makes that item more than what is omit-
ted, even if there are only two items.' A simple example
11 See John B. Van Huyck et al., Credible Assignments in Coordination Games, 4
Games & Econ. Behav. 606 (1992).
,2 See id. at 614-15.
43 See Rick K. Wilson & Carl M. Rhodes, Leadership and Credibility in N-Person
Coordination Games, 41 J. Conflict Resol. 767,778 (1997).
"See id. at 785.
45 There is no problem in extending the example to games with more than three
equilibria-in this example, meeting places. Indeed, the more possible meeting places
there are, the more significance R and C are likely to attach to the fact that a third-
party mentions only one of them. Of course, with fewer than two equilibria, the
coordination problem disappears.
4Frequently, there will be a rational explanation: Individuals may find something
salient because it seems abnormal, given their judgment about what constitutes the
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demonstrates the point nicely. Suppose R sits in a room and is
asked to choose between the colors red and blue with the goal of
selecting the same color C chooses in another room at the same
time. Immediately before R and C are to make their selections,
each is told that they are each allowed to watch on a monitor a sin-
gle event that the other will see as well. The event is a person
spinning a pointer in which the arrow will land with a 50% prob-
ability on a space colored blue and a 50% probability on a space
colored red. The arrow winds up pointing at blue. What will the
players do? As a logical matter, the selection of blue stands out no
more than the nonselection of red. Nonetheless, most people's in-
tuition (which is strong evidence of what most people would do) is
to select blue. Whether from something in the structure of human
psychology or a rationally explicable meta-convention 47 most peo-
ple view something "pointed to" by words or symbols, such as an
arrow, as being more primary than something not pointed to. For
my purposes, it is sufficient that this is a fact, regardless of its
cause.
2. Legal Rules as Focal Points
In expressive law theories, there is a strong temptation to focus
immediately on some kind of moral theory to explain how the law
creates compliance. But the moral authority or legitimacy of law is
not necessary to create a focal point. If the above analysis is correct,
then legal expression can, like other third-party communication, pro-
vide a focal point for coordinating individual action. Because the
"mentioned" solution tends to be the most salient, when the legal
rule is sufficiently publicized, it provides salience to one kind of
behavior. Law can thereby work expressively even if people do not
believe they have a moral obligation to obey it.
normal case. For example, if the parties believe that the newspaper rarely publishes
photographs of local places on the front page, then what stands out as nonstandard is
the photographed place. But if the newspaper almost always mentions P1 and P2 on
the front page, then it would be salient that one these places is not mentioned. Even if
R and C are unaware of any baseline of newspaper behavior because both are new to
the town, they may rely on a broader baseline to regard a place being mentioned as
more unusual than its being omitted. So, absent information to the contrary, the fact
that something is mentioned is more salient than its not being mentioned.
47People might develop an affinity for solving coordination games by adopting
"meta-conventions" such as, when there is no other basis for selecting a strategy, to
pick the one most recently "mentioned" or "pointed to," explicitly or implicitly.
1666 [Vol. 86:1649
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To illustrate, consider a coordination game involving traffic
rules. The obvious example is the decision regarding what side of
the road to drive on, left or right. To avoid head-on collisions, each
driver prefers to drive on the left if the others drive on the left and
to drive on the right if the others drive on the right. This presents a
pure coordination problem if we assume the drivers have no pref-
erence for a side of the road other than this preference to drive on
the same side as others (of course, "same" here means that indi-
viduals driving towards one another are on opposite sides).
Figure 2 illustrates the two-person version of the game. D1 and
D2 can each play strategies R or L, driving on the right or left, re-
spectively. Each driver receives more expected utility from driving
on the same side of the road and avoiding the risk of head-on colli-
sions (0) than from driving on different sides (-20).' The two Nash
equilibria are RIR and LIL (where both drivers choose R or both
choose L); at each point, each driver would lose from a unilateral
change in strategy. The coordination problem is perhaps trivial if
the drivers communicate and agree. But assume they cannot com-
municate (as will be likely when the game involves many drivers).
Nothing in the context of the situation makes one solution salient.
Quite possibly the drivers will fail to coordinate, at least in the first
instance.
R L
R 0, 0 -20,-20
L -20,-20 0, 0
FIGURE2
In this context, a third-party message can provide a focal point
that facilitates coordination. Suppose the state issues a proclama-
tion that says, "Drivers stay on the left." The state publicizes the
proclamation in some manner such as mass media ads, posted
signs, or "town criers" who yell the proclamation from hilltops. As-
sume that this state never enforces "proclamations" and that it is
41 The interests would still be common even if they were not equal as they are in this
example. Thus, there would still be a pure coordination game if D2 had a sturdier car
than D1, so that RIL or LIR produced a payoff for D2 of only -5 instead of -20. But
for simplicity, I generally use equal payoffs.
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well known they are only precatory. Therefore, no one believes
that the state will punish their driving on the right or reward their
driving on the left. Nonetheless, governmental expression may
immediately solve the coordination problem and create a conven-
tion of driving on the left. If there is no other basis for preferring
left or right, the message makes one strategy stand out from the
other. Each individual selects the salient strategy because they ex-
pect the other to do the same and each has an interest in doing
what the other does. Because there are only two strategies, this
claim assumes that a mentioned option will be more salient than an
unmentioned one, and for the reasons stated above, this is proba-
bly true. Once the proclamation makes driving on the left focal,
self-interest causes individuals to drive on the left.
3. The Comparative Advantage of Legal Expression: Publicity,
Uniqueness, and the Reputation of Government Officials
So far, the analysis shows only that law can work like any other
form of third-party expression to create a focal point. I will not
provide a general theory of when state expression, as opposed to
some other third-party expression, is necessary. But there are three
reasons to suppose that legal expression can sometimes facilitate
coordination when other third-party communication cannot. The
publicity frequently accorded law means it is more likely to create
the expectations necessary for coordination. Further, various fea-
tures of law create-a uniqueness to legal expression that frequently
causes its message to "stand out" against the background of public
discourse. Finally, because the publicity and uniqueness of law
gives government officials the ability to create a focal point and in-
fluence behavior, these officials may develop a reputation for
correctly "predicting" future behavior. The claim is not that law is
invariably better than private expression at facilitating coordina-
tion, but only that it often is.
The first advantage to legal expression is publicity. A third-party
communication can create a focal point only if there is common
knowledge (or something close to it) about the message. Many
communications will fail this requirement. Of course, nothing
guarantees that law will be sufficiently publicized to create this
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common knowledge. The public often remains ignorant or misin-
formed of the content of a law.49 But law is often well-publicized
and more likely to produce the necessary common knowledge than
anything else. Laws achieve notoriety in several ways. Sometimes
the state advertises its laws.' Indeed, if publicity solves a coordina-
tion problem, we may think of it as a public good that will, absent
government provision, be undersupplied. Second, private media
publicize law. In a democracy, the struggle over new legislation and
its ultimate resolution is often newsworthy. Finally, the fact that
law is sometimes enforced by sanctions gives individuals a greater
reason to learn of it than of other third-party messages. Law almost
always has a formal sanction and usually has a positive expected
sanction. This fact creates an incentive for individuals to discover
what the expected sanction is. 1
The second possible advantage of law, in some situations, is
uniqueness. Anything that makes law stand out against other com-
peting messages, by that reason alone makes it qualitatively more
"emphatic" than conflicting messages. This view is similar to the
claim that Robert Cooter makes when he discusses the internalized
duty to obey law52 and the claim that Paul Robinson and John Dar-
ley make when they discuss the "moral credibility" of law.
3
Although I agree that these factors are important, I want to suggest
that law can speak more emphatically even if it has no more legiti-
macy or moral authority than competing messages.
49See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle
Disputes 48-51, 70-71 (1991); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring
the Influences on Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 447, 447-49 (1999);
Martha Williams & Jay Hall, Knowledge of the Law in Texas: Socioeconomic and
Ethnic Differences, 7 L. & Soc'y Rev. 99, 99-100 (1972).
5o0The classic cases are highway signs that announce "Keep Right," "Speed Limit
55," "No Littering," and so on. Government also publicizes legal rules in public
service announcements and on official forms, and by compelling private parties to
provide publicity (such as requiring sellers of alcohol or tobacco to post minimum
ages for purchase).
11 Of course, I want to separate the effects law produces by its sanctions from other
effects of law. But it is not necessary to enforce a particular law to generate an interest
in learning of its content. It is difficult to discover which laws are unenforced without
first finding out what the law is. Because people don't know about sanctions until they
look, they tend to pay some attention to the content of legal expression, particularly
criminal law, independent of actual sanctions.
See Cooter, Good Laws, supra note 1, at 39-46.
-" See Robinson & Darley, supra note 1, at 477-88.
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To illustrate, suppose the coordination problem is the need for a
standard unit of measurement. Everyone would prefer to use the
standard that everyone else uses. Suppose that, like the meeting-
place problem, the alternatives have been narrowed to three: the X
system, the Y system, and the Z system. Finally, suppose that there
are a large number of messages favoring each system, and, though
everyone knows there are a large number of messages, there is no
common knowledge about the exact number of messages. Given
imperfect information and bounded rationality, no one is sure
which system is endorsed most frequently, or whether others know
which system is endorsed most frequently. In this situation, the
mere publicity of a legal proclamation stating "Use the X system"
is not sufficient to make that system the focal point. Because there
is already (a) common knowledge that each system is endorsed by
a large number of messages and (b) uncertainty about what the ex-
act number of endorsements of each system is, the addition of one
more message will probably have no effect. The result seems to be
that the individuals will randomly select among the three systems.
Here is where the characteristics of the message, particularly
those associated with the messenger, could matter. Anything that
makes a speaker unique may make its message "stick out" from the
rest; other things equal, the unique message creates the focal point.
With law, there is a temptation to focus immediately on moral dif-
ferences between legal and nonlegal expression. If law has unique
"legitimacy" or "moral credibility," then that characteristic will
certainly matter to the focal point theory. But the characteristics do
not matter because people will believe that the measuring system
offered by a "legitimate" speaker was better than a measuring sys-
tem offered by an "illegitimate" speaker. Everyone may realize
that any measurement system is as good as any other, as long as
everyone uses the same one. Instead, the characteristics associated
with legitimacy matter, on this account, only to the extent they dis-
tinguish one message from the rest. If many religious leaders
conflict in endorsing systems X, Y, and Z, and only one state proc-
lamation endorses system Z, the law may create a focal point of Z
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even though it is perceived to be no more morally authoritative
than the religious leaders.'
More generally, law may be perceived as unique for reasons re-
lated, but only loosely, to the state's moral authority. For example,
most individuals perceive a "public/private" distinction in the ac-
tions of governmental and nongovernmental agents. That
distinction may be based upon the state retaining some minimum
of perceived legitimacy. But as long as that exists, and if the state
speaks with one "voice," then a legal expression may be unique
even though it is not perceived as legitimate, merely because it is
the only "public" message relevant to a particular problem. As an-
other example, sanctions not only give law the publicity advantage
discussed above, they may make law unique compared to messages
that do not carry sanctions. In this case, the merely formal threat of
sanctions, even if it is perceived as carrying an expected cost of
zero, may distinguish legal expression. Thus, law is perceived as be-
ing "different" from other private, nonbinding speech; the
peculiarity of law gives it a special ability to create focal points.
The final advantage law may enjoy in creating focal points is that
the government officials who articulate legal rules-mostly judges
and legislators-may develop a reputation for correctly predicting
behavioral change. This is the point made separately by Cooter and
Eric Posner." If an individual can predict future behavior, then his
statement that everyone is moving toward a particular equilibrium
gives everyone an incentive to play the strategy associated with
that equilibrium (which is the best response to what others do at
that outcome). The ability of public officials to make such predic-
tions would appear, however, to be highly uncertain. Indeed,
Posner's theory concerns the U.S. Supreme Court, but Justices
seem to be particularly ill-trained to make predictions of social
change.
The publicity and uniqueness of law, however, may explain how
judges and legislators develop such a reputation. Because the law is
publicized and unique, it creates focal points. Those who articulate
law and its pronouncements therefore appear to predict behavioral
Conversely, if several local governments conflict in endorsing systems X, Y, and
Z, and only one religious leader endorses system Z, that leader's message may create
a focal point of Z.
55 See Cooter, Good Laws, supra note 1, at 23; Posner, Inefficient Norms, supra note 3.
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change but are actually causing such change. At time period one,
certain legal decisionmakers enjoy no reputation for predicting be-
havior but the publicity and uniqueness of their announcements
nonetheless create a focal point and affect behavior expressively.
At time period two, people realize that behavior tends to follow
what these legal decisionmakers proclaim. Now, in addition to
wielding the power to create focal points via public and unique
proclamations, they enjoy a reputation for doing so, which en-
hances their expressive powers. The reputation gives people a
greater reason to seek out the expressions of judges and legislators,
which itself makes their expressions more visible and more likely
to be perceived as unique.
II. EXPANDING THE FOCAL POINT MODEL:
LEGAL RULES IN GAMES OF CONFLicr
That law can have this kind of expressive effect is crucial. Yet
the insight that the state can succeed in designating one side of the
road for driving without imposing sanctions is not novel or particu-
larly important. The question is whether the analysis suggests a
larger role for the focal-point function of law. Pure coordination
games, like the side-of-the-road decision, are rare. If the govern-
ment's focal-point role is limited to such cases, it is of minor
practical significance.
To the contrary, however, the law's effect on coordination of
behavior has much broader application. Focal points continue to
matter even when the interaction is not purely one of coordination;
they matter to any game in which the players have some common
interest, even if they also have conflicting interests. This Part will
first review some of these "mixed-motive" games. Second, I will
show that, because focal points can affect play in these mixed-
motive games, the law's ability to create focal points matters to a
broad set of social interactions.
A. Focal Points in Mixed-Motive and Bargaining Games
Schelling begins his analysis of focal points in pure coordination
games but his main concern is to demonstrate their effect in other
games, including those involving conflict. Consider two common
1672 [Vol. 86:1649
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examples: the "Battle of the Sexes" game and the "Hawk-Dove"
game.
Figure 3 represents the two-person "Battle of the Sexes" game.6
As a concrete example, imagine that the strategies are two differ-
ent locations where lost players can meet, each player prefers
meeting to not meeting, but each prefers meeting at a different
place. (Or this could be the side-of-the-road problem where the
different drivers each prefer driving on a different side of the road,
but each has a stronger preference for coordinating on the same
side.) Given the payoffs shown, there are two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria, R1/C1 and R2/C2. At these points, neither player can
improve her situation by a unilateral change in strategy. There is
conflict because R prefers the Ri/C1 outcome but C prefers the
R2/C2 outcome. The parties nonetheless have a common interest
in avoiding the R1/C2 and R2/Cl outcomes, where each is worse





Focal points continue to matter. To explain why, consider first
that nothing favors a particular pure Nash equilibrium. We might
therefore expect the players to use a "mixed" strategy of playing
each pure strategy-Ri or R2, C1 or C2-with some probability. In
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, R plays R1 with a probability
of 2/3 and R2 with a probability 1/3; C plays C1 with a probability
of 1/3 and C2 with a probability of 2/3.'7 The expected payoff for
,' The game gets its name from the first, rather antiquated, scenario used to
illustrate the payoff structure: a husband and wife who each prefer spending the
evening attending the same event, but the husband prefers boxing to the opera, while
the wife prefers the opera to boxing. For a brief discussion of the sexist imagery in
many game theory descriptions, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic
Rationales for Mediation, 80 Va. L. Rev. 323, 373 n.124 (1994).
The pair of strategies R and C employ are in equilibrium only if neither would
have a reason to change unilaterally. If R plays R1 and R2 with the respective
probabilities of 2/3 and 1/3, then C has the same expected return from playing C1 (2/3
chance of coordinating times payoff of 1) or C2 (1/3 chance of coordinating times
payoff of 2) or any mixed strategy of C1 and C2. Similarly, if C plays C1 and C2 with
the respective probabilities of 1/3 and 2/3, then R has the same expected return from
playing R1, R2, or any mix of R1 and R2. Thus, when both R and C play their
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each player is 2/3.' Yet if the players can meet at one location with
certainty, each does better, gaining a payoff of at least 1. Interest-
ingly, in this case, if the parties communicated, we cannot be
certain they would reach an agreement because each would try to
convince the other they were committed to going to their favored
place. But imagine there is no communication. Both players can
benefit if some event makes focal or salient one of the two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria.
Imagine that on the day this problem arises, the daily newspaper
(that each knows each reads) mentions P2 (the place represented
by R2/C2) and not P1 on its front page. As before, based on a psy-
chological fact or a meta-convention about coordinating at
"mentioned" points, this causes the players to each believe the
other will go to P2. Now it is in both player's interests to go to P2.
Even R is better off with a payoff of 1 at P2 than 0 at P1. This re-
sult also follows on the weaker condition that the third-party
communication makes R and C each believe the other is now more
likely to go to P2 than to P1. Thus, even within a game with con-
flicting interests, there may be some common interests in
coordinating and a focal point may facilitate this coordination to
the benefit of both parties.
A second mixed-motive game-one that will serve as the basis
for much subsequent analysis-is alternatively called "Chicken" or
"Hawk-Dove." Here, the level of conflict between the parties is
greater than the Battle of the Sexes game. Figure 4 provides an il-
lustration. Each player chooses whether to play an aggressive
"Hawk" strategy or a submissive "Dove" strategy. The most desir-
able outcome comes from playing Hawk against Dove (here
providing a utility of 2), followed by playing Dove against Dove
(1), playing Dove against Hawk (0), and playing Hawk against
Hawk (-2).59
strategies with the specified probabilities of 2/3 and 1/3 and 1/3 and 2/3, neither has a
reason to change strategies.
5R's expected return is the sum of four products, each product being the
probability of an outcome times the payoff he gets for that outcome. The probability
of an outcome is the probability R and C will play the necessary strategies. Thus, R's
expected return is (a) 2/3 times 1/3 times 2, plus (b) 2/3 times 2/3 times 0, plus (c) 1/3
times 2/3 times 1, plus (d) 1/3 times 1/3 times 0. The sum is 2/3. The same is true 'or C.
59 Calling the game "Chicken" refers to the original illustration of a supposedly real
game between (presumably male) teenagers, where they would drive their cars
toward each other and the one that did not swerve "won" the game. If only one
swerved, he lost "face" but if neither swerved, the outcome for each was disastrous.
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The game is a general way of modeling any situation where an
individual chooses between an aggressive or submissive strategy
that has the above ranking of outcomes. Robert Sugden uses the
game to model disputes over a valuable resource-firewood-
between two players in a "state of nature" who are equally able to
fight.' If Hawk is played against Dove, the Hawk gets the firewood
without a fight. If Dove is played against Dove, they divide the
firewood equally (or randomly allocate it among themselves). If
Hawk is played against Hawk, there is a fight, the winner gets the
firewood, but the expected value of the fight for both players is
negative; each player is equally-50%-likely to win but fighting
costs more than 50% of the value of the firewood.
In this game, the divergence of interests is sharp. Each prefers to
play Hawk to the other's Dove. But the parties still share an interest
in avoiding a Hawk/Hawk outcome. Here too, focal points matter.
The game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: Hawk/Dove and
Dove/Hawk.61 If nothing makes one equilibrium "stick out," game
theory provides scant basis for predicting which equilibrium will be
played. The players might select a mixed strategy, selecting each
pure strategy with some probability, where the two probabilities
sum to one. But if something in the context of the situation makes
one of these equilibria salient, both players would have a reason to
play the strategy that produces that equilibrium. Though neither
player wants to play Dove to the other's Hawk, a player prefers
playing Dove if he expects the other to play Hawk. Thus, anything
that makes the other's Hawk strategy focal gives one a reason to
play Dove. I will illustrate this point more fully below.
10 See Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare 58-62
(1986). The following discussion of the Hawk-Dove game is based on Sugden's
analysis. Sugden also uses two other mixed-motive games-"War of Attrition" and
"Division"-to discuss the convention of property. See id. at 62-78.
6, Given either of these outcomes, neither player would gain by unilaterally
changing strategies.
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Schelling used the term "tacit" agreement to refer to the coordi-
nation outcome in games without communication. 2 The final step
in the case for the importance of focal points is that they remain
important even when communication and bargaining are possible.
Indeed, Schelling's interest in tacit focal point solutions to pure co-
ordination games was based on the belief that they were a useful
benchmark for understanding bargaining games.3 The reason is
that whenever parties bargain, each side considers the other's offer
against the background of what will happen if no agreement is
struck. In many games, the tacit solution describes what will hap-
pen without an agreement. For example, in the above Battle of the
Sexes game, each player might insist in bargaining on his preferred
meeting place. But what if at the beginning of the bargaining, both
sides recognize that one equilibrium-one meeting place-is focal?
That fact may give the proponent of that site a decisive advantage
in bargaining. He knows that refusing to bargain will achieve his
end. The other player can, of course, insist that he will not go to the
focal point meeting place, just as the first player will insist that he
will. In the end, however, what makes one threat more credible is
whatever makes the solution it insists upon the focal one. Experi-
mental evidence supports this claim.'
B. A Second Pass at an Expressive Theory: Using Law to
Create Focal Points in Mixed-Motive Games
As with pure coordination games, third-party communication
can create a focal point in mixed-motive games. Schelling gives a
number of examples where third-party communication, intended
for this purpose, produces coordination:
"See Schelling, supra note 13, at 69.
6See id. at 53-54.
61 See Ken Binmore, et al., Focal Points and Bargaining, 22 Int'l J. Game Theory
381, 384 (1993) (finding that even when the players knew that initial bargaining was
against a computer, the interactions created a focal point for later bargaining with
other subjects); Mehta et al., Experimental Investigation, supra note 28, at 214-16
(finding that a random distribution of "aces" dealt to the players and said to
collectively represent ten pounds, though irrelevant to standard analysis, significantly
affected bargaining distribution); Alvin E. Roth, Toward a Focal-Point Theory of
Bargaining, in Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining 259 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1985);
Alvin E. Roth & J. Keith Murnighan, The Role of Information in Bargaining: An
Experimental Study, 50 Econometrica 1123, 1140-41 (1982).
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The bystander who jumps into an intersection and begins to di-
rect traffic at an impromptu traffic jam is conceded the power
to discriminate among cars by being able to offer a sufficient in-
crease in efficiency to benefit even the cars most discriminated
against; his directions have only the power of suggestion, but
coordination requires the common acceptance of some source
of suggestion. Similarly, the participants of a square dance may
all be thoroughly dissatisfied with the particular dances being
called, but as long as the caller has the microphone, nobody can
dance anything else. The white line down the center of the road
is a mediator, and very likely it can err substantially toward one
side or the other before the disadvantaged side finds advantage
in denying its authority.5
In each of these situations, one player prefers to coordinate at
some equilibrium other than the one the third party selects. That is
the conflict that makes the game mixed motive. But the desire to
avoid a costly coordination failure is sufficient to make that player
play the salient strategy, which is the one named by the third party.
We can see this same process at work in one of Schelling's ex-
periments. In the scenario he describes to the subjects, one subject
A has lost $16 in cash and another subject B has found it.' They
are told (i) that if they cannot agree to a division of the money, it
will be forfeited to "the house" and each will receive $0, and (ii)
that after some fruitless bargaining, the house orders that each pri-
vately write down the amount they insist upon, as their final
opportunity to coordinate on a division.' There are multiple
equilibria of two amounts adding to $16 and each player prefers
outcomes in which he gets more to outcomes in which he gets less.
The twist is that the players are also told (iii) that immediately be-
fore writing down a number, a "well known and respected
mediator" proposes to each player some "fair" division: $11 for A
and $5 for B.' All of Schelling's subjects accepted the mediator's
proposal.' Apparently, because nothing else made one solution sa-
6Schelling, supra note 13, at 144.
6See id. at 62-63.
67See id.
6"Id.
"See id. at 63 n.4. See also id. at 68 ("[M]ediators often display a power to
precipitate agreement and a power to determine the terms of agreement; their
proposals often seem to be accepted less by reason of their inherent fairness or
reasonableness than by a kind of resignation by both participants.").
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lient, the mediator's communication was sufficient. More recent
experimental evidence further supports this finding.70
My claim is that law works to solve coordination problems in the
same way that these third parties work. The law can direct behav-
ior much like a bystander directs traffic. In particular, the state has
a focal power to adjudicate disputes between pairs of individuals
and to regulate behavior among all individuals. In each case, the
law works by changing expectations in a manner that is independ-
ent of the threat to impose sanctions.
1. The Expressive Power of Adjudication
Begin with the "bystander" example. The traffic problem the by-
stander solves is a Chicken game in almost the classic sense: Two
cars edge into an intersection and each would prefer the other to
stop (especially if they expect a long line of traffic to follow). What
exactly does the bystander do to solve this situation? Physically, let's
say he holds up one palm towards one car to indicate "hold" and
uses his other hand to '"wave on" the other car. Why does this
work? Not because the drivers fear that the bystander will impose
some sanctions on them for failing to accede to his signals. Nor do
the drivers need to perceive that the bystander has some "moral
authority" that makes his decisions "legitimate." Both factors may
cause people to obey a police officer who directs traffic.7 But we
expect that most drivers will accede to a mere bystander even
though he was not selected by any "fair" process, nor is he known
to use a "fair" means of selecting who goes first. His actions work
70 See Van Huyck et al., supra note 41, at 616-17. The experiment described there
used a two-party game with three equilibria in which the payoffs were 7,3; 5,5; and 3,7.
The subjects were assigned the role of the "row" or "column" player and played the
game six times against randomly selected subjects. When the experimenter/arbiter
selected one of the unequal equilibria (the same announced in advance for all six
repetitions), a significant number of players switched from the equal equilibria to the
selected one. More than half, however, ignored the arbiter's selection and stuck with
the equal equilibria. But when the arbiter alternated the selection of unequal
equilibria for the six games-letting row and column players each take three turns at
receiving the higher amount-all the players eventually settled on playing the
arbiter's selection. See id. at 620-21.
71 More generally, a shared morality can, like any shared beliefs, create a focal point.
If it is common knowledge that people tend to believe a certain outcome is
normatively just, then we may predict that the player who "deserves," on this theory,
to play Hawk will play Hawk. Even a player who does not share this morality will play
Dove when he believes the other player will rely on the morality in deciding how to
act.
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because they make one equilibrium focal-the one in which the
"waved on" driver plays Hawk and the "held" driver plays Dove.
Because the driver told to "hold" believes that the other driver is
more likely to play Hawk, he is more likely to play Dove. Because
the driver "waved on" believes that the other driver is more likely
to play Dove, he is more likely to play Hawk.
Now consider adjudication. The conventional hypothesis is that
a judge's power to resolve a case depends on sanctions, specifically,
the sanctions that enforce a legal judgment. The traffic example
and the mediator experiment reveal, however, the expressive
power of adjudication. Just like the bystander and the mediator,
the judge can affect the outcome by affecting the expectations of
the parties. The change in expectations occurs merely because the
judge's communication makes one equilibrium solution salient and
focal.
This possibility is significant because legal disputes often take
the form of a Hawk-Dove game. To see this, assume that two par-
ties have a dispute-over incompatible claims to property, a breach
of promise, child custody, or compensation for accidental injury,
for example-and each can either "give in" to the other's demands
(Dove) or stand ready to "fight" (Hawk). Their interaction takes
the Hawk-Dove form and the parties rank the resulting outcomes
as follows: (1) play Hawk against Dove (getting one's way in the
dispute); (2) play Dove against Dove (compromising); (3) play
Dove against Hawk (letting the other party get his way); and (4)
play Hawk against Hawk (fighting). Figure 4 may then be taken to
represent many disputes.
Let me be clear what "fighting" means in these circumstances.
First, as in Sugden's Firewood game, the Hawk-Hawk outcome
may mean a physical brawl, a fight in the most basic sense. Even
with criminal sanctions for assault, there is still a significant amount
of violent "self-help" in situations like this,' a point sometimes
overlooked by legal theorists. But there is another meaning of a
"fight." We can expand the applicability of the Hawk-Dove game
72 See, e.g., James M. Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine 74 (1988); Ellickson,
supra note 49, at 58-59, 213-19; Interpersonal Violent Behaviors: Social and Cultural
Aspects (R. Barry Ruback & Neil A. Weiner eds., 1995); Richard E. Nisbett & Dov
Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South (1996); Donald
Black, Crime as Social Control, 48 Am. Soc. Rev. 34 (1983).
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by recognizing, that, where violence is actually deterred, the Hawk
strategy consists of the willingness to engage in one or more heated
verbal confrontations that, like fighting, are costly to both parties.
Verbal confrontation is costly because it takes time and partici-
pants find that "causing a scene" is embarrassing and emotionally
taxing.73 If "causing a scene" is substituted for (or along with) fight-
ing, then many social situations are Hawk-Dove games.
In such a game, a judge's pronouncement works like the by-
stander's actions in the traffic jam. Even if the judge has no power
to impose sanctions, he changes the expectations each player holds
about the likelihood the other player will impose the private "sanc-
tion" of fighting. By finding for Party A, the judge is, in essence,
"waving on" that party to play Hawk and- telling Party B to play
Dove. And like the mediator experiment, each party expects that
the other is most likely to play the strategy "mentioned" and advo-
cated by the third party. If A believes that B will play Hawk, it is in
A's interest to play Dove; if B believes that A will play Dove, it is
in B's interest to play Hawk. By changing expectations, the judge's
statement of the outcome becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.74 At
the least, we would be wrong to assume that, if there is no sanction
attached to ignoring the judge's order, then there is no effect to her
decision.
My claim, then, is that judges possess the power of a mediator.
Game theorists have discussed mediation, but as far as I can tell,
have largely ignored Schelling's claim that the mediator derives
power from his ability to make certain solutions focal. Roger My-
erson, for example, demonstrates the very interesting point that a
mediator who uses some randomizing element for choosing rec-
ommendations can create new and more efficient equilibria to a
73 Confrontations involve dropping the normal rules of civil interaction that shield
individuals from emotional harm. Being shouted at and insulted and responding in
kind causes unpleasant physiological reactions (heightened blood pressure, for
example) and ruins one's peace of mind for some time thereafter. Part of the reason is
the "flight or fight" reaction to a threat of violence. If one cares about avoiding
disapproval, another cost is that bystanders may view those involved in the scene to
be intemperate, rude, and childish.
74 Cf. Schelling, supra note 13, at 68 ("'Fact-finding' reports may also tend to draw
expectations to a focus, by providing a suggestion to fill the vacuum of indeterminacy
that otherwise exists; it is not the facts themselves, but the creation of a specific
suggestion, that seems to exercise the influence.").
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game.' Jennifer Brown and Ian Ayres use this theory to explain (in
part) the function of real world mediators.76 Their example is the
Battle of the Sexes game set out in Figure 5, which we may inter-
pret as a meeting-place problem in which there is strong conflict





Without a mediator, Brown and Ayres show that the players in a
particular game will adopt a mixed strategy in which they gain the
benefits of meeting only 28% of the time, for an expected payoff of
0.83.' But suppose a mediator recommends meeting at one place
or the other based on a flip of a coin. If each side follows the me-
diator's recommendation, the two players meet 100% of the time
and each gains an expected payoff of 3*78 The problem, however,
assumes that the players cannot make a binding commitment to
each other, so the key question is why would the players follow the
mediator's recommendation? Obviously, no one expects the media-
tor to impose sanctions, nor does the discussion assume that the
parties have internalized a moral duty to obey the mediator. Myer-
son only says that "Neither player could ever expect to gain by
disobeying the mediator's recommendations, if the other player is
expected to obey them."'9 But why would this expectation exist? My
claim is that the expectation exists simply because the mediator
makes one solution focal.
This analysis is not limited to games where randomizing creates
new equilibria: In any one-shot game with multiple equilibria, a
third-party signal of one equilibrium can make that outcome focal.
Given the above analysis, we can usually model legal disputes as
this type of game-specifically, as a Hawk-Dove game. The mecha-
nism of choosing the third party to give the signal, or having a third
5 See Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict 249-58 (1991).
16 See Brown & Ayres, supra note 56, at 373-77.
" See id. at 374.
7See id. at 375.
7 Roger B. Myerson, Multistage Games with Communication, 54 Econometrica 323,
327 (1986) (emphasis added).
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party who routinely gives such signals, makes the effect clearer by
ensuring common knowledge about what the signal is. In sum, ad-
judicative rulings generally have an expressive power.
Strangely enough, the clearest example of this analysis comes
from medieval Iceland. For several hundred years, Iceland had
functioning courts with no formal or informal enforcement pow-
ers.' During this time, courts issued rulings to resolve disputes, and
proclaimed appropriate penalties, but there was no executive
arm-police or sheriffs-to execute these judgments. Nonetheless,
there was private enforcement of court decrees, carried out by the
kin of the judicial winner. In his review of William Miller's book on
the subject, Richard Posner summarized Miller's explanation for
effectiveness of private enforcement:
Legal judgments were not self-executing, and if the convicted
defendant thumbed his nose at a judgment the plaintiff would
have to rally his kin to enforce the judgment by force, much as
if he had decided to retaliate directly against the defendant for
whatever wrong had touched off their dispute. But, as Miller
explains, a legal judgment might have enough suasive force to
make it easier for the plaintiff to rally his allies and also easier
for the defendant's potential allies to beg off, thus tending to
isolate the defendant and so vindicating the plaintiff's decision
to go to law rather than to fight."
The critical question is, what explains the "suasive force" of the
unenforced legal judgment?
The full explanation is undoubtedly complex, but the focal point
theory provides a simple and important insight. Each party expects
the one declared by the court as being "in the right" to play the
Hawk strategy-enforcing the remedy with violence, if necessary.
Expecting that result, each party will tend to play Hawk if named
as the winner of the dispute and Dove otherwise. This focal effect
is independent of the moral authority of the court or the persua-
siveness of its reasons for deciding. Even if each party (and his kin)
, See William Ian Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in
Saga Iceland 5 (1990); Richard A. Posner, Medieval Iceland and Modem Legal
Scholarship, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1495, 1496-97 (1992) (reviewing Miller's book); David
Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case, 8 J. Legal
Stud. 399,404-05 (1979).
SI Posner, supra note 80, at 1506 (emphasis added).
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believes unalterably in the rightness of his cause, and cannot be
persuaded otherwise, he may still respond to the change in expec-
tations. As noted above, this result would occur even if the third
party were a private individual who, like the bystander, interjected
his opinion without being asked by either party to do so. But we
can imagine several reasons why a court's or arbitrator's statement
is more powerful. In the case of arbitrators, the parties have to-
gether selected a third party to make one solution focal. In the case
of litigation, what we mean by a "court" is a body that makes pro-
nouncements about disputes that nearly everyone gives attention
to (even though only one party may have chosen to litigate).
To explain adjudication more fully, we must make the analysis
dynamic and consider the evolution of strategy over time. I do that
below. For now, note that whenever there is common knowledge
that both sides to a dispute are paying special attention to a third
party, that party's announced resolution tends to make focal the
strategies associated with that resolution. These conditions fre-
quently describe the decisions of a judge, who thereby wields the
expressive power of adjudication.
2. The Expressive Power of Regulation
Adjudication is limited to the parties to the dispute and occurs
only after there is a dispute. Legislative and executive rules apply
to a much broader group. These rules also influence behavior, in-
dependent of sanctions, by influencing expectations in mixed-
motive games. When transaction costs prevent bargaining, regula-
tion can shape the expectations of what behavioral strategy others
will select. Where there is bargaining, regulation can shape expec-
tations of what part of the surplus must be given to others to secure
their agreement.
a. Expressive Effects When Transaction Costs Prevent Bargaining
To see how regulatory law works expressively, return to Schel-
ling's example of the "white line down the center of the road."'
This is a humble but powerful illustration of the coordinating
1 Below I address a question raised by this analysis: Why not use randomized
methods of adjudication to resolve disputes? See infra Section III.B.1.
3 Schelling, supra note 13, at 144.
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power of government action, as well as the limits of that power. At
any given moment, drivers wish to avoid using the same part of the
road as oncoming traffic, which at curves or the crests of hills
would cause an accident. At the same time, drivers presumably
prefer to have the option of driving on more of the road, defining
"their" side of the road as being larger than half the width of the
road. Yet there is no possibility of bargaining in advance with all
other drivers about how to share the road. The parties therefore
play a game of Chicken with simultaneous moves (in that there
isn't always time to veer over and avoid a collision).
In this situation, the painted line in the road is an overwhelming
focal point that tends to fix expectations of how far over oncoming
traffic will drive. A given driver has a significant reason to "obey"
the line even if the state provides no enforcement of it. Of course,
there is a limit to this focal point, as Schelling notes. If the state
draws the line too far over-as where a car cannot even fit into the
smaller lane-drivers will ignore the line. In addition, this is not a
power limited to government. Anyone who owned a road could
create the focal point by painting the line. But when employed by
the government, the line, and the corresponding legal rule forbidding
drivers from crossing the line, generate compliance independent of
the state's threat to impose sanctions.
A more interesting example is smoking regulation, which I de-
velop in greater detail below. For now, imagine that Figure 4
represents two individuals who contest the use of a resource, here
the air in a particular place and time. Specifically, R wishes to
smoke a cigarette and C wishes to breathe air unsullied by tobacco
smoke. When the conflict arises only once between the individuals
(they are strangers), transactions costs will usually deter bargain-
ing. The reason is that the time to conduct the transaction is likely
to be very large compared to the time it takes to smoke a ciga-
rette84
4 If the smoker refrains from smoking during the negotiation, the nonsmoker may
get what he wants for free. But if the smoker smokes during negotiation, he gets what
he wants for free. There is a second transaction cost. One who offers to pay others
encounters a strategic problem. An offer to pay a nonsmoker, for example, will attract
other nonsmokers who would not otherwise have come close enough to be bothered
by the smoke, but who will now demand payment to permit smoking. A converse
problem arises for those who offer to pay others not to smoke. These transaction costs
make bargaining over smoking very unlikely.
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We can then model the smoking conflict as a Hawk-Dove game
much like Sugden's Firewood game. Imagine that playing Hawk
consists of a willingness to engage in either a physical fight or a
heated verbal confrontation for one's preferred outcome and that
Dove/Dove means some kind of compromise solution (like flipping
a coin to determine whether R can smoke). If this describes the
situation correctly, then both parties have an interest in avoiding
the Hawk/Hawk outcome, although each would prefer to get their
way. Anything that makes one equilibrium focal will help the par-
ties to coordinate in avoiding a "scene." If nothing else makes a
solution focal, a law against smoking in the particular place would
likely have this effect. Because the mentioned solution is focal, the
law creates the expectation that C will play Hawk, risking a scene
by insisting on R not smoking. That expectation causes R to play
Dove and not smoke.
The focal point analysis may be reinterpreted by saying that law
can shape behavior by exploiting "second-party" sanctions. When
two parties are involved in an interaction, each may control the
behavior of the other by credibly threatening to impose sanctions,
that is, to act in some way the other finds costly. The focal point
theory says that the state can influence the way these second party
sanctions are used-whether, for example, smokers or nonsmokers
will "cause a scene" to enforce their preferences. This theory con-
trasts with or supplements a social contract theory of the state. A
social contractarian might say that the proper role of the state is to
stop all Hawk/Hawk interactions, which it does by monopolizing the
means of violence. But suppose the state permits, either inevitably
or intentionally, some low-level violence to remain undeterred. Or
suppose the state permits, as one would expect, nonviolent social
confrontations or "scenes" to remain undeterred. The state can
then influence behavior, not only by threatening sanctions (backed
85 More complex games are more realistic. In Hawk-Dove, for example, the smoker
and nonsmoker incur costs in the stage of the game that is a fight or scene. This
implies the parties incur no costs at the earlier stages, for example, when the
nonsmoker simply requests that the smoker refrain or desist. The War of Attrition
models each stage of the scene as incurring additional costs, as each tries to "wait out"
the other and get his way. See Sudgen, supra note 60, at 62-66, 73-78. An even more
realistic game might have the costs each incurs rising as the standoff continues. I do
not believe, however, that these more complex games are necessary to reveal the
expressive claim being made.
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ultimately by the threat of state violence), but by changing expecta-
tions about the sanctions individuals will use against each other.
b. Expressive Effects on Bargaining
The analysis so far assumes that transaction costs prevent the
parties from bargaining to resolve their conflict. When bargaining
does occur, legal rules can also expressively influence the outcome.
Specifically, legal rules can indirectly affect how the parties divide
any contractual surplus. To illustrate this expressive effect, I con-
sider a rule that really has no sanction: a contractual default rule.
Although the standard economic view is that the allocation of
property entitlements will affect the distribution of wealth, it is also
standard to assume that contractual default rules will not affect the
distribution of the surplus between the contracting parties.' Yet a
number of experimental studies have found, to the contrary, that
individuals favored by the default rule tend to gain a greater share
of the surplus.' Focal points may explain why.
Initially, note that a variety of experiments show that nonlegal
focal points affect how parties divide the surplus. Recall Schelling's
mediation experiment. The mediator proposes a split of $16: $11 to
A (who lost the money) and $5 to B (who found it). With no sub-
sequent bargaining, and where both players knew they each would
take nothing if their aggregate demand exceeded $16, all the sub-
jects accepted the proposed split. These results imply, first, that
behavior the law merely "proposes" can create a focal effect. In
other words, we should expect that "default" rules, as well as man-
datory rules, will influence behavior expressively. The second
interesting point is that there is no reason to suppose the focal ef-
fect disappears with subsequent bargaining. To the contrary, the
psychological literature on "anchoring" suggests that the first pro-
"' See Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. Legal Stud.
13, 16-18 (1972); John J. Donohue, III, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive
Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells, 99 Yale L.J. 549, 550 (1989); Stewart
Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. Legal Stud. 237,
239-41 (1988).
81 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1583, 1626-
27 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
Cornell L. Rev. 608, 675-76 (1998); Schwab, supra note 86, at 254-56.
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posed split strongly affects bargaining.' If the parties bargain fur-
ther, we can easily imagine that player A will assert that $11 is the
least he will accept but it is really too little and that player B will
assert that $5 is the least he will accept and it is really not enough.
If, after another period of bargaining, the parties fail to reach
agreement, we can imagine each returning to the same reasoning
that led them in the actual experiment to accept the proposed divi-
sion: A reasons that B will demand at least $5 and B reasons that A
will demand at least $11. There is nothing to support this result but
the fact that the third-party proposal made that division salient,
which created the self-fulfilling expectations.'
Studies like this suggest that legal rules could affect bargaining
by proposing "fair" solutions? Suppose A is offering to act as B's
agent and the two bargain over how to divide the surplus created
by their relationship. Part III will consider how the prior existence
of a convention might limit the power of a legal rule. But if there
were no existing convention, a default rule proclaiming that con-
tractual parties of A's type-a sports agent or car salesperson-
should take 20% of the profit "unless otherwise agreed" could
have a significant effect on the outcome of bargaining.
Most real world default rules do not take this form. Rather than
proposing how to divide the surplus, they typically provide specific
provisions for carrying out the contract unless otherwise agreed.
Examples are Uniform Commercial Code terms specifying the de-
fault place for the delivery of goods and a default set of
warranties.9' But the focal point analysis suggests a way of explain-
ing how these default rules, according to various experiments, still
See Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real
Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39
Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 84,85 (1987).
Schelling imagines that bargaining to divide a fixed gain or loss often takes the
form of trying to employ "focal points" that favor one's side. See Schelling, supra note
13, at 68-69. In other words, B might plausibly use the focal point of a 50-50 split to
demand $8 or, perhaps if the parties were personal injury lawyers, B might demand a
1/3 share, or $5.33. But it is harder to imagine B making a successful demand for $7 or
$10 (successful because A either agreed or in the end game demanded only the
remaining amount). There are no obvious cultural or historical references that make
this kind of division focal, and thus B will find it hard to persuade A that his insistence
on this split is credible.
90 See sources cited supra note 64.
91 See U.C.C. § 2-308 (2000) (regarding unspecified delivery term); U.C.C. §§ 2-314,
2-315 (2000) (regarding implied warranties).
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affect distribution. The rules create a focal baseline of contractual
duties and entitlements. The parties then bargain with this baseline
in mind. Each player expects others to consider the baseline. The
result is that a player insists upon receiving some compensation-
an extra bit of the surplus-for "giving up" a default entitlement or
for "taking on" a burden the default rule places on the other party.
This may not seem very sensible because the player favored by
the default rule has no real entitlement unless the other contracting
party agrees and the other party is free to withhold agreement. But
there is no powerful logic constraining the division of the surplus.
Instead, those who study negotiations point out how individuals at-
tempt to seize upon or create focal effects in their favorY Each
party expects this behavior, so it is more credible to threaten to re-
fuse an offer that falls short of some focal point than to threaten to
refuse an offer that equals or exceeds the focal point. The fact that
one party "gives up" a default entitlement may thus make credible
its insistence on an extra share of the surplus.' If so, then default
rules affect the division of the surplus.
3. The Continued Need for Sanctions
Throughout this Article, I claim that law can influence behavior
expressively, independent of sanctions. But it should be clear that
the expressive power of law does not imply that sanctions are un-
necessary. Most obviously, not all social interactions involve
coordination. Where the problem is cooperation, sanctions may be
necessary to change the payoffs so that individuals do not play a
dominant strategy that produces an inefficient outcome. Even
when coordination is involved, the payoffs in certain games make it
exceedingly difficult to coordinate or to coordinate at the most ef-
ficient equilibrium. When certain noncoordination outcomes
impose great costs on those who attempted but failed to coordi-
nate, the focal effect may fail to reassure people sufficiently to
9See J. Keith Murnighan, Bargaining Games 39-40 (1992); supra note 89.
9See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 Geo. L.J. 1789,
1821-25 (2000) (explaining the norm of reciprocity under which parties exchange
concessions).
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move them away from their "safe" strategy." Sanctions may then
be necessary.
Most importantly, the analysis in this Article is exceedingly sim-
plified by having individuals with identical payoffs. Obviously,
payoffs actually vary between individuals in almost any real case.
This difference particularly matters because, in a given social con-
text, the payoffs may create a coordination problem for some
drivers but not others. Even in deciding on which side of the road
to drive, for example, many drivers are on rare occasion willing to
violate the convention for a short distance because there is some
great gain and apparently a small risk. (Think of people taking
risks to get a good parking spot.) Because the risk is partly exter-
nalized-that is, because an accident will harm others besides the
drivers-they will take excessive risks unless the state provides
sanctions for violating the convention. In other situations, a few in-
dividuals may in every case be willing to violate a convention. Take
Sugden's Firewood game. For an extraordinarily fierce and skilled
fighter, the expected payoffs from fighting over property might be
positive. For that person, the game is not Hawk-Dove because
fighting is the dominant strategy. If society wants to stop this indi-
vidual from playing Hawk when occupying the role of a challenger
(because of the external costs of fighting and/or its objectionable
distributive consequences), it will have to impose sanctions.
In sum, the expressive effect matters because it predicts some
compliance independent of sanctions, not because it predicts an ef-
ficient level of compliance without sanctions. I will not repeat this
point below, but it applies with equal force to the evolutionary
analysis in the next Part.
94An example is airplane traffic. Flyers have a great interest in coordinating their
flight paths to avoid an accident. Absent a centralized authority, one might imagine
that the most efficient way of coordinating involves some regularized
communications. But because a crash is catastrophic, everyone might assume that
they could not rely on all others to coordinate voluntarily through the requisite
communications, even if the government proclaimed to everyone what the requisite
communication pattern was. As a result, flyers might adopt the "safe" but inefficient
strategy of taking extraordinary and expensive precautions (including not flying at
all). By imposing sanctions on those who fail to coordinate, however, the government
might reach a more efficient outcome.
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III. MAKING THE MODEL DYNAMIC: EXPRESSIVE LAW
AND THE EVOLUTION OF EQUILIBRIA
A crucial aspect of many real world games is that the strategic
situation is repeated. People do not decide only once on which side
of the road to drive. Repetition raises the possibility that even if
players fail to coordinate the first time the situation arises, they will
eventually settle into a coordination equilibrium. For example,
drivers might initially fail to coordinate by all driving on the left or
the right side of the road. But over time, their behavior might settle
into an equilibrium of one or the other. In repeated games with
multiple equilibria, the equilibrium that emerges is often called a
convention.95 A considerable amount of recent game theory is de-
voted to explaining the evolutionary process by which conventions
emerge.96 The evolution in these newer models typically does not
occur through increased sexual reproduction of players who enjoy
greater success in the recurrent game. Rather, evolution occurs by
players, often imperfectly rational, learning from experience in the
game and, for future interactions, switching to strategies that pro-
vide greater expected utility. To date, law and economics has not
incorporated much of this theory.' Because law is concerned with
situations that occur repeatedly, an expressive theory of law should
9 Much of the law and economics literature on "norms" addresses what some
philosophers and game theorists call a "convention." Both involve behavioral
regularities. Conventions are sustained because the regularity represents an
equilibrium such that no individual can benefit by unilaterally changing his strategy.
Norms may also be conventions but are necessarily sustained in part by the additional
fact that individuals tend to approve conformity to the regularity and/or disapprove of
nonconformity. See Richard H. McAdams, Conventions and Norms (Philosophical
Aspects), in International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences(forthcoming 2001). Below, I refine this definition of convention to include only a
"pure-strategy" equilibrium.
6 See, e.g., Ken Binmore, 1 Game Theory and the Social Contract: Playing Fair
(1994); Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, The Theory of Learning in Games
1998); Larry Samuelson, Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (1997); H.
Peyton Young, Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of
Institutions (1998).
For exceptions, see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 45-46, 177-79 (2000);
Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. Legal
Stud. 337 (1997); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative
Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1225, 1246-47 (1997); Paul
G. Mahoney & Chris Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the
Fittest Norm Efficient? (May 1, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association) available on the Social Science Research Network,
http://www.ssrn.com, as Legal Studies Working Paper No. 00-15; Posner, Evolution of
Constitutions, supra note 3.
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explain any expressive function as part of this dynamic process. Yet
evolutionary processes may circumscribe the significance of the fo-
cal point theory. First, conventions can arise without law. Second,
once an equilibrium arises, the convention the equilibrium repre-
sents is likely to be focal. If so, it isn't clear that law could make
any other equilibrium more focal. If everyone is currently driving
on the right side of the road, an unenforced government proclama-
tion to "drive on the left" would probably not change the
convention.
Nonetheless, though the power of existing equilibria constrains
the expressive power of law, it does not eliminate it. Indeed, the
evolutionary analysis reveals another means by which law can have
an expressive effect. Evolutionary game theory shows that law can
influence behavior by its labeling power. Labeling the players'
roles creates the possibility of strategies based on those roles. Cre-
ating new strategies creates new potential equilibria. Law may
therefore be able to change behavior merely by describing it.
In this Part, I will continue using the Hawk-Dove game to dem-
onstrate, first, how adaptive learning might explain the evolution of
a coordinated equilibrium and, second, how the labeling of strate-
gies can influence this evolution. I will then discuss how law can be
used to "label" the strategies for the players so as to influence the
evolutionary process. As a result, both adjudication and regulation
retain their expressive power in iterated situations.
A. Recurrent Games, Labeling, and the Evolution of Equilibria
Figure 4 illustrated a symmetric Hawk-Dove game,' and the
above analysis assumed the players interacted only once. Sugden
contrasts this game with one that is recurrent.' Suppose that in
each iteration of the game, two players are selected at random
from a large pool and play against each other once. In the anony-
mous version of the game (with no opportunity for establishing a
I See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
9 See Sugden, supra note 60, at 78-80. I realize that Sugden's analysis is 15 years old
and no longer represents the "state of the art" in evolutionary game theory. For
recent developments, see the sources cited supra note 97. Nonetheless, Sugden's
highly accessible analysis is sufficient for my purpose, which is merely to illustrate
informally how legal expression affects behavior independent of legal sanctions.
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reputation),1°° the expected value of playing a particular strategy
depends on the probability p that a random player plays Dove.
With the Figure 4 payoffs, a player is better off playing Dove if p <
2/3 and better off playing Hawk if p > 2/3. For example, if p = 1/2,
then the expected value of playing Dove is 0.5(1) + 0.5(0) = .5,
while the expected value of playing Hawk is 0.5(2) + 0.5(-2) = 0.
Sugden's evolutionary analysis predicts the equilibrium in this
game. The evolution occurs by players learning from experience in
the game and switching to strategies that provide greater expected
utility. With adaptive learning, players will tend to switch to Dove
(either as a pure strategy or with a greater probability in a mixed
strategy) when p < 2/3 and tend to switch to Hawk when p > 2/3.
The population will reach equilibrium only when p = 2/3.101 This
"mixed" equilibrium could result from 2/3 of the population play-
ing Dove as a pure strategy and the rest playing Hawk as a pure
strategy, or from everyone playing Dove 2/3 of the time and Hawk
1/3 of the time, or from various other distributions of mixed strate-
gies. Whatever the combination that emerges, the theory predicts
that 2/3 of the strategies selected in equilibrium will be Dove.
Note also that this mixed Nash equilibrium has a special kind of
stability: Any position close to the equilibrium is carried by adap-
tive learning back to the equilibrium. Suppose some random event
causes p to rise above or fall below 2/3. The random event might be
the introduction of new players to the game who do not immedi-
ately grasp the best way to play. Or it might be any other kind of
random perturbation to the system. The same adaptive learning
that initially led individuals to adopt strategies where p = 2/3, will
cause the same equilibrium to reemerge. If p rises above 2/3, then
the expected payoffs from Dove will be lower than the expected
-0 All of the iterated games I analyze assume that the two players are selected at
random from a large pool and are therefore strangers to each other. If the game is
played repeatedly against known individuals, it would obviously introduce a
reputational element that would complicate the analysis. But even there, the focal
point might affect the bargaining between the players in the same way that default
rules affect the division of the surplus. See supra Section II.A.
101 The expected return from playing Dove is equal to the probability that the other
will play Dove--p-times the return from Dove/Dove-1-plus the probability that
the other will play Hawk-(1-p)-times the return from Dove/Hawk-0. Similarly,
the expected return from playing Hawk is p(2) + (1-p)(-2). Equilibrium occurs where
there is no reason for anyone to switch strategies because the expected returns from
playing Hawk equal the expected return from playing Dove, that is, where p(l) + (1-
p)(0) = p(2) + (1-p)(-2). This equation reduces to p = 2/3.
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payoffs from Hawk and some players will switch from the former
strategy to the latter. If p falls below 2/3, the expected payoffs from
Hawk will be lower than the expected payoffs from Dove and some
players will switch to the latter. The incentive to change strategies
disappears only when p returns to 2/3. Thus, this equilibrium is par-
ticularly stable; it "attracts" nearby states.
Now I should explain what I meant when I called this a symmet-
ric version of the Hawk-Dove game. Not only are the payoffs
symmetric, there is nothing else in the labeling associated with the
game that distinguishes the two players. In the normal form repre-
sentation of the game, it does not matter which player is the row
player and which is the column player. As a result, there are only
three possible strategies for either player:
(1) play Hawk;
(2) play Dove; and
(3) play Hawk with probability h and Dove with probability
(1 - h), where 0 < h < 1."
A remarkable insight of game theory, exploited to great effect
by Robert Sugden,ln is the importance of labeling the parties in a
manner known to each. Anything that breaks the symmetry of the
game in this manner increases the number of possible strategies.
The existence of new strategies can produce substantial changes in
the evolutionary outcome. Thus, labeling can change behavior.
Suppose, for example, that the players notice some asymmetry in
the game, if only a trivial one, that distinguishes the roles of the
players. It could be anything-for example, that one player is al-
ways older. Any recognized asymmetry in the player's roles means
that the players can choose to play a strategy depending on which
role they occupy. Thus, in addition to the above three strategies,
each player can now choose two more: "play Hawk when younger
and Dove when older," and "play Dove when younger and Hawk
when older." Sugden's particular example is more interesting. He
uses an asymmetric version of the Hawk-Dove game to show how
the convention of property might have emerged in a state of na-
112 Technically, this third option represents an infinite number of strategies, because
h can take any value between 0 and 1. But the idea is that one has three basic
choices-play one pure strategy, play the other pure strategy, or play a mix of the
two.
13 See Sugden, supra note 60, at 12-13.
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ture." He imagines that the players recognize the asymmetry of
who is the current "possessor" of a resource. Only one player is the
possessor and both are aware of this labeling asymmetry. Suppose
we call the nonpossessor the "challenger." The matrix in Figure 6
represents this asymmetric version of the Hawk-Dove game, al-




"Possessor" Hawk 2,0 -2,-2
FIGURE 6
That the players notice this difference in how they label them-
selves may seem insignificant, but the asymmetry creates two pure
strategies that did not exist in the symmetric version of the game.
In addition to the three strategies noted above, each player can se-
lect:
(4) play Hawk when possessor and Dove when challenger; and
(5) play Dove when possessor and Hawk when challenger.
Most importantly, these two new strategies create two new pure-
strategy Nash equilibria in the game: where all play Strategy 4 or
all play Strategy 5. At these points, no individual can gain from
unilaterally switching strategies. For example, if everyone else
plays Strategy 4-Hawk when the possessor and Dove when the
challenger-then any one will be worse off by ever playing Dove
when the possessor (giving up the payoff of 2 for a payoff of 1) and
by ever playing Hawk when the challenger (giving up the payoff of
0 for a payoff of -2). The same is true for strategy 5.
I previously stated that a convention is a Nash equilibrium that
emerges from a strategic situation with multiple equilibria. Now I
will more precisely define convention as the prevailing pure-
strategy equilibrium, and the expectations that support it, where
more than one equilibrium is possible. If everyone in the Firewood
game follows Strategy 4 or Strategy 5, we can say there is a conven-
tion, respectively, of possessors defending their property or of
challengers taking property. In addition to these two possible con-
114 See id.
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ventions, the mixed equilibrium of Figure 5, where p = 2/3, also
remains an equilibrium. I do not call this a convention, however,
because one observes no strong regularity of behavior, but rather a
mix of behaviors.
Note that, when the two pure-strategy equilibria become possi-
ble, the mixed equilibrium is no longer stable. Once the players
notice the possessor/challenger asymmetry, the mixed equilibrium
does not "attract" nearby states; instead, random perturbations will
cause behavior to move away from it. Suppose, for example, that
the probability that a challenger plays Dove rises, by accident,
above 2/3. With fewer challengers playing Hawk, the value of pos-
sessors playing Hawk will rise. If players learn, they will tend to
switch to playing Hawk when they are the possessor. As more pos-
sessors play Hawk, the value of playing Dove when one is the
challenger will rise. If players continue to learn, the disequilibrium
will be resolved only with a pure-strategy equilibrium in which eve-
ryone plays Strategy 4. With this convention, all possessors play
Hawk all the time (the probability of playing Dove is 0) and all
challengers play Dove all the time (the probability is 1). But if the
initial perturbation caused p for a challenger (that is, the probabil-
ity that a challenger will play Dove) to fall below 2/3, the same
process of adaptive learning would lead to a pure-strategy equilib-
rium in which everyone plays Strategy 5."° The analysis also reveals
that the two new pure-strategy equilibria are stable. As long as p,
for a challenger, remains above 2/3, it will tend to rise to 1. As long
as p, for a challenger, remains below 2/3, it will tend to fall to 0.
Thus, the two pure-strategy equilibria-conventions-"attract"
nearby states and are therefore more likely to emerge in the long
run than the unstable mixed equilibrium.
A mere label can thus produce significant behavioral change. If
the players do not notice this labeling distinction between posses-
sor and challenger, we expect a stable mixed equilibrium where 2/3
0 Sugden claims that certain factors make the first equilibrium, where everyone
follows Strategy 4, more likely and that this convention-that possessors retain their
possessions-illustrates Hume's idea that property rights are conventional. See
Sugden, supra note 60, at 90-103; See also Jack Hirshleifer, Economic Behaviour in
Adversity 223-34 (1987) (discussing evolution of possession-based property
conventions); Peter Vanderschraaf, The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account
of Convention, 14 Econ. & Phil. 215 (1998) (discussing Hume's account of property as
an evolved convention).
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of decisions are to play Dove. The result is that 1/9 of interactions
result in a Hawk/Hawk fight. °6 But when mutual recognition of the
labels breaks the symmetry, evolutionary processes will most likely
produce a stable pure-strategy equilibrium-a convention-in which
everyone plays Hawk when in one role and Dove when in the
other.Y Whichever convention emerges, there are no Hawk/Hawk
fights. 108
B. A Final Pass at an Expressive Theory: Using Law to Create Focal
Points in an Evolutionary Setting
1. The Expressive Power of Adjudication in Iterated Situations
I previously modeled disputes as a one-shot Hawk-Dove game.
In such games, an adjudicator has the expressive power to make
one outcome focal and thereby to influence the parties' expecta-
tions and behavior. Now imagine that there is a recurring Hawk-
Dove situation that has the potential to create disputes between
individuals. Quite possibly, the parties will exploit some natural
asymmetries to create conventions that avoid fights in many situa-
tions. Sugden's analysis, for example, suggests that individuals
might avoid conflicts over property once they recognize the asym-
metry of possession and everyone plays a pure-strategy based on
that asymmetry. But there will remain some situations in which
10 The probability of a fight is equal to the probability of player 1 selecting Hawk-
1/3-times the probability of player 2 selecting Hawk-/3.
107 The difference can also be measured by the change in expected utility. Without
the label, each player's expected utility is 2/3 (calculated by multiplying the
probability of each combination of strategies by the player's outcome for that
combination, and summing the products). With the label, a player's utility depends on
the proportion of time he is a possessor or challenger. If the players occupied each
role half the time, each player's expected utility would be 1 (half the time they gain 0;
half the time they gain 2). Total utility is necessarily higher with the label because
there are no costly fights, but a particular player's utility would decline with the label
if he were the challenger (playing Dove) more than 2/3 of the time. Thus, the
convention could be bad for some individuals; if the initial distribution were unfair on
some normative theory, the convention would only lock in this unfairness. But the
point here is only to show that labeling has an effect, not that the effect is inevitably
desirable.
103This analysis obviously simplifies a complex phenomenon. Individuals do not
always follow the convention because (a) individuals vary continuously and some
have idiosyncratic payoffs that produce no incentive to ever follow the convention;
and (b) situations vary continuously and some create an incentive for certain
individuals to violate the convention. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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disputes arise; this is where adjudication can have an expressive ef-
fect.
One reason for disputes is that the asymmetry the convention
exploits leaves unresolved certain ambiguous cases. In these situa-
tions where the parties may otherwise fight, adjudication retains
the power to influence the behavior of the parties. The ambiguity
problem can be illustrated- by returning to Sugden's possession
asymmetry. The power of possession arises from the fact that both
parties readily observe that one and only one party currently pos-
sesses the property. But any law student knows there are situations
in which "possession" is hard to define. Who "possesses" a domes-
tic animal if no one is physically holding it? Perhaps the convention
will arise that one "possesses" an animal if one has placed perma-
nent and distinctive physical markings on it. But what if no
technology exists for making such a mark? Or what if it is uncer-
tain whose mark is on the animal? Or what if the marked animal
wanders away from the possessor's living area for an extended pe-
riod of time? In the latter case, it seems unlikely that everyone
would play Dove regarding apparently "lost" property. And what
property is lost is also far from obvious.1"
These types of uncertainties produce several new possibilities
that greatly complicate the analysis. I will focus on one possible
outcome: that everyone attempts to play a pure possession-based
strategy, following a convention as best as they can given imperfect
information. This might make sense if, for example, the players
have different perceptions about whether possession is clear or not.
That is, just as there is no clear asymmetry between possession and
nonpossession, there is no clear asymmetry between the clear cases
and the unclear ones. Such players might all play Hawk when it
appeared to them that they were the possessor and play Dove oth-
erwise."' Because of mistakes, sometimes two players will both
believe they are the possessor, and the result is a fight.
119 Eric Posner makes this point with a different example. See Posner, Inefficient
Norms, supra note 3, at 1716 (noting that the decentralized property conventions
would not be efficient because of the ambiguity of "possession" when the property
consists of "large areas of land or chattels that are best used by third parties").
-°We could also imagine the players playing probabilistic strategies like "play
Hawk when the probability that one is the possessor is greater than p and play Dove
when the probability that one is the possessor is less than p." This would lead to a
convention and no fighting if everyone always agreed on the probabilities, but by
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Now introduce adjudication."' Suppose that the state offers the
services of a judge, who, upon request by both parties, will effec-
tively "proclaim" that one side should play Hawk and the other
should play Dove. Adjudication thus complicates the game, creat-
ing a prior stage at which one decides whether or not to propose
adjudication. There are serious strategic problems that may block
the use of adjudication. I will not fully analyze these problems. I
want only to show (i) that the strategic concerns are more likely to
infect the use of randomized adjudication than "fact-based" adju-
dication, and (ii) when sought, adjudication will have an effect
independent of the sanctions the adjudicator threatens.
Previously, I used the focal point theory to explain the sanc-
tionless adjudication that occurred in medieval Iceland. Because
that discussion considered only randomized adjudication, however,
it did not explain why the Icelanders or anyone else would bother
with the expense of a more elaborate, fact-based adjudication. In
this iterated situation and given the payoffs from Figure 4, if the
parties seek randomizing adjudication only when a mistake caused
a dispute, then their obeying the adjudicator would make them bet-
ter off."2 But if flipping a coin works, the disputants would not even
need the services of a third party; they could select a randomizing
event themselves.
The problem, however, is that randomizing creates an enormous
incentive for individuals to seek adjudication when neither side ac-
hypothesis, that is not the case. So even if the parties somehow settled upon the same
value for p (among an infinite number of values), we would still wind up with fights
when each judged the probability that he was the possessor to be greater than p. So
there would be a residuum of cases in which fighting occurs.
M Eric Posner notes a different legal solution. When the problem is defining who
owns land or personal property used by third parties, a recording system resolves the
ambiguity. See Posner, Inefficient Norms, supra note 3, at 1716. Adjudication is
useful, however, for resolving remaining ambiguities.
112 Adjudication thus creates a new asymmetry, the result of which is two new
strategies: (6) play Hawk when one wins the adjudication and Dove when one loses the
adjudication; and (7) play Dove when one wins the adjudication and Hawk when one
loses the adjudication. As a result there are at least two new equilibria, where
everyone plays Strategy 6-a convention of following the arbitrator-and where
everyone plays Strategy 7-a convention of defying the arbitrator. Where the mixed
equilibrium exists, the expected payoff from any strategy is 2/3. One does better in
one of the new equilibria based on Strategy 6 or Strategy 7. In either case, with a coin
flip, each party takes turns playing Hawk against Dove and Dove against Hawk,
avoiding the negative result of a Hawk/Hawk fight. The expected payoff is 1. Thus, if
the costs of adjudication are not too high, then everyone would prefer to adjudicate
the unclear cases.
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tually makes a mistake. Even when R knows that C is the posses-
sor, the prospect of randomized adjudication gives R an incentive
to assert that he possesses the property, pretending he has made a
mistake, so that he can gain a fifty percent chance of acquiring it.
An individual who believes he is the possessor will not be able to
distinguish between those who actually believe they are also pos-
sessors (and absent adjudication will play Hawk) and individuals
who are bluffing (and absent adjudication will play Dove). The
outcome of such games is complex, but it is likely that individuals
will believe that most of those who demand adjudication are bluff-
ing, and therefore decide to reject adjudication in every case or a
large percentage of them.
Fact-based adjudication will ameliorate (though not eliminate)
the strategic problem. Suppose that the adjudicator investigates the
facts and provides an informed opinion of which party did "pos-
sess" the property (or of any other fact relevant to playing the
pure-strategy equilibrium). As with randomized adjudication, the
fact-based variety would make focal one particular solution, allow-
ing the parties to avoid a Hawk-Hawk fight and improve their
expected payoff."3 Unlike the random process, however, the prob-
ability of winning varies positively with the strength of one's case.
When there is only one party who actually believes he is the pos-
sessor, the fact-based adjudicator is more likely to rule in his favor.
As a result, the returns for engaging in strategic behavior decline.
If the fact-finding were perfect, an individual who believes he is not
the possessor would expect zero returns from asserting otherwise.
Of course, given the hypothesis that possession is ambiguous, the
fact-finding will not be perfect. But if the loser must bear any cost
for fact-based adjudication (even if the winner also bears costs),
then imperfect fact-finding may be accurate enough to deter most
of the false assertions of possession that would occur with random-
ized adjudication. Though not completely deterred, we may get a
mixed equilibrium in which parties often adjudicate but sometimes
don't. Various mechanisms defining the adjudication process may
raIn addition to the focal point effect, fact-based adjudication also works
expressively by providing the players with information to update their prior beliefs. If
the judge were thought to be sufficiently reliable in ascertaining the facts, then the
signal would always cause the "losing" player to believe he was not the possessor.
Given his strategy, the losing player will then play Dove. See Dharmapala &
McAdams, supra note 5.
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constrain the strategic problem and increase the use of adjudica-
tion."'
So the intuitive answer is right after all: Flipping a coin is (usu-
ally) no way to settle these disputes. Fact-based adjudication may
be. When the facts matter, parties could conceivably conduct the
investigation themselves, but they are more likely to seek the ser-
vices of a third party. First, certain individuals may specialize in
clarifying adjudication and may therefore be better at it than either
of the parties. Second, the parties may believe that each will inter-
pret information in a self-serving manner,115 so that it would be
difficult to agree on what the facts are or at least would require
more investigation than what a third party requires.
To whatever extent the parties use third party, fact-based adju-
dication, it can influence behavior by creating a focal point.
Without adjudication, the parties attempt to follow the possession-
based convention but a "fuzziness" in possession causes mistakes
and produces fights. Adjudicative findings of fact clarify the ambi-
guity and remove the fuzziness in the asymmetry on which the
pure-strategies are based. The legal process thus "perfects" the
convention.116 In sum, law works expressively by shaping behavior
independent of its sanctions. Although there may be reasons to add
114One important real-world feature is that, contrary to the assumption in the text, a
single party can "force" another party into adjudication. But for this structure, it may
be that no party would ask for adjudication because to do so would signal doubt about
one's status as a "possessor," which in turn would give the other party an incentive to
play Hawk without adjudication. In addition to providing adjudication at the request
of one party, the state also announces a regulatory rule that any party using self-
help-playing Hawk-prior to the judge's resolution may forfeit the entitlement. This
regulation may fail to work expressively, but even if sanctions are necessary to induce
individuals use the judicial option, the textual point is that the ultimate judicial
resolution may be self-enforcing merely because everyone expects the winner to play
Hawk.
115 See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85
Am. Econ. Rev. 1337 (1995); Marc J. Knez & Colin F. Camerer, Outside Options and
Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments, 10 Games &
Econ. Behav. 65 (1995); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L.
Rev. 1051, 1060-66 (2000); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of
Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. Legal Stud. 135 (1993).
116 New conventions may also be possible if adjudication is available to clarify what
would otherwise be prohibitively ambiguous boundaries.
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sanctions,"7 we should not be surprised that sanctionless, fact-based
adjudication worked in medieval Iceland to resolve disputes.
2. The Expressive Power of Regulation in Iterated Situations
Now consider the expressive power of regulation from the per-
spective of evolutionary game theory. In the one-shot game, legal
regulation influences behavior by making focal one of several pos-
sible equilibria. In the iterated situation, the possibility of an
existing equilibrium greatly complicates the situation. A set of
strategies constitutes an equilibrium because no one player can im-
prove his situation by changing strategies unilaterally. The power
of the law to change an equilibrium, without first using sanctions to
change the payoffs, may seem limited.
Nonetheless, legal regulation can expressively influence behav-
ior even in iterated situations. At the most basic level, law might
work because there is no existing equilibrium or because some
other force has disrupted the existing equilibrium.118 Prior to the
regulation, we may have disequilibrium or an unstable mixed equi-
librium that will eventually tip into a stable pure-strategy
equilibrium. By proclaiming one of the possible pure-strategy equi-
libria, the law could simply influence which one is selected or at
least speed up the process that would have otherwise been
achieved."9
-'If the players bear all the costs of their fighting, they will purchase an efficient
level of fact-based adjudication. But if there are serious negative externalities to their
fighting, they will purchase an inefficiently low amount. One way to encourage more
adjudication is for the government to subsidize it. If so, it would then make sense for
government to subsidize an institution-the courts-to provide this function at less
than the actual costs. It might also then make sense to require adjudication in some
instances, that is, to forbid self-help. Whether these normative points are correct or
not, where parties could otherwise engage in mutually destructive self-help, thejudicial adjudication of disputes can be expected to have an effect independent of the
sanctions the court uses to enforce its decisions.
s For example, more recent evolutionary game theory emphasizes the potential of
persistent "mutations" to upset Nash equilibria. The idea is that random mutations
will, with some small but nonzero probability, occur in clusters. See, e.g., Dean Foster
& Peyton Young, Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics, 38 Theoretical
Population Biology 219 (1990).
119 1 argue that the abundance of asymmetries in any situation creates an abundance
of possible strategies, more than the few typically explored in formal evolutionary
models. See Section III.B.2.b. Consequently, in any real world situation, there are
likely to be many more individuals who first begin pursuing inferior strategies, and
therefore more time is necessary for them to figure out which one is best. The amount
of time spent in disequilibrium may then be significant. Picker's simulation of
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But law can do more than simply speed up an evolutionary proc-
ess already under way. By providing a focal point, legal rules have
the potential to displace an existing equilibrium. The new law can
change behavior in three ways. First, with any equilibrium, the le-
gal focal point may compete with the equilibrium, causing
individuals to doubt whether past play will in fact predict future
play. Second, with a mixed equilibrium, the law may label a feature
of the environment, causing individuals to play pure strategies
based on the asymmetry created by the label. If so, the law replaces
the mixed equilibria with a convention. Third, with any equilib-
rium, the law can clarify an asymmetry, causing people to play pure
strategies based on the clarified asymmetry. If so, the law either
replaces a mixed equilibrium with a convention or replaces one
convention with another. Thus, in iterated situations, regulatory
law has a competing, a labeling, and a clarifying function.
a. Competing: Using Regulation to Create a Competing Focal Point
The first point requires that we fully understand the power of an
existing equilibrium. I contend that the equilibrium predicts future
behavior only because, in equilibrium, past play provides a focal
point for future coordination. Whether the law can offset this focal
point is then an empirical question.
We must begin with this question: Why does a Nash equilibrium
tend to persist? More precisely, when there are multiple equilibria,
and the players have somehow reached one of them, what reason-
ing process leads each individual to play the same strategy in the
next round that he played in the last round? Recall that at a Nash
equilibrium, an individual cannot do better by unilaterally changing
strategies. Suppose the issue is smoking and the current equilib-
rium is that smokers play Hawk and nonsmokers play Dove-a
prosmoking convention. Given the equilibrium, if other smokers
continue to play Hawk, then a single nonsmoker will be worse off
switching to Hawk. If other nonsmokers continue to play Dove,
then any one smoker would be worse off switching to Dove.
repeated coordination games might seem to suggest otherwise. See Picker, supra note
97, at 1282-87. But he imagines that agents choose between one of only two possible
strategies. Given hundreds or thousands of possible equilibria, it could take a long
time to settle on a single equilibrium through adaptive learning.
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In general, everyone in the game can reason this way: If all other
players do in round t + 1 what they did in round t, then I am best
off doing what I did in round t. But this is not sufficient. Even if
each individual is best off doing what he did before on the condi-
tion that everyone else does what they did before, how does each
individual know the others will do what they did before? One is
tempted to say that each other player will also reason that he is
better off sticking with his prior strategy if everyone else does the
same. But this is circular. I need to decide what others will do-
specifically, that everyone else will do the same-before I decide
what is the best thing for me to do, but what others will do depends
on (among other things) what I will decide to do."f
My contention is that the stability of an existing Nash equilib-
rium depends entirely on the fact that past equilibrium behavior is
focal. If there is more than one Nash equilibrium, then once the
players achieve one of the equilibria, it is now a unique point. It is
the only equilibrium they have ever jointly achieved, or it is at least
the only equilibrium recently achieved and recent precedent may,
other things equal, be more easily remembered than older prece-
dent. Although the players could decide to act differently in the
next round, they know they would have trouble coordinating at any
equilibrium other than the one just achieved. For example, imagine
that several people once "accidentally" solved a meeting-place
problem by randomly going to P3, and subsequently, they find
themselves in a very similar meeting-place problem. Their shared
history makes P3 focal. Even if each player prefers another meet-
ing place to P3 (but the preferred alternative is different for each
player), P3 still stands out. The point is much stronger when ap-
plied to a long-lasting equilibrium: One cannot be certain others
will stick to their prior strategy, but there is no compelling reason
for them to make any move other than what the current equilib-
rium requires.
The important implication is that, if the last round's equilibrium
outcome is stable only to the extent it is focal, then anything that
creates another focal point has the potential to upset the equilib-
rium. For example, a convention may dictate that the driver on the
right at an intersection has priority, but if both drivers see a by-
,'0 See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 31, at 217.
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stander directing the driver on the right to stop and "waving on"
the driver on the left, it is an empirical question how they will be-
have. Similarly, in a setting where the convention is to tolerate
smoking, the posting of "no smoking" signs may cause smokers and
nonsmokers to wonder whether nonsmokers generally will con-
tinue to play the Dove and whether smokers will continue to play
Hawk. That everyone wonders about the validity of past precedent
is enough to rob the precedent of its inevitability. The result is un-
certain, but when law provides a competing focal point, it could
cause a jump from one equilibrium to another, not because of the
fear of legal sanctions, but because of a fear of negative payoffs
from playing one's prior strategy when everyone else switches to a
new strategy.
b. Labeling: Using Regulation to Focus Attention on an Asymmetry
and Supplant an Existing Mixed Equilibrium
In the Firewood game used to introduce the evolutionary analy-
sis, the players somehow jointly "notice" an asymmetry between
the possessor and nonpossessor of the property. They label their
roles themselves. The recognition destabilizes the mixed equilib-
rium; after that, random perturbations are likely to produce a
convention based on the asymmetry.
Now consider how a third party might label the environment so
as to cause the players to notice an asymmetry. The third party
may then destabilize the mixed equilibrium and produce significant
behavioral change. For this purpose, consider Sugden's "Cross-
roads game."'' Imagine a remote place where there is no law
governing who has priority at an intersection of two roads. When
two cars approach the intersection on different roads, we have a
Hawk-Dove game: Each prefers to maintain speed while the other
slows down and yields, but each strongly prefers avoiding a colli-
sion that occurs if both drivers maintain speed. In the symmetric
version of the game, the payoffs are like those in Figure 4." We
predict that evolutionary processes produce an mixed equilibria in
which Yield (the Dove strategy) is played 2/3 of the time and colli-
2
, See'Sugden, supra note 60, at 34-52. Sugden discusses the decentralized evolution
of conventions to solve this game, but not the use of law (or other intentional labeling
devices) as I discuss in the text.
llSee supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
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sions occur 1/9 of the time (when both drivers play Maintain
Speed, the Hawk strategy).
In this context, anything that breaks the symmetry-by creating
common knowledge of a particular asymmetry-is likely to pro-
duce, over time, an equilibrium with no Hawk/Hawk collisions.
One obvious means of breaking the symmetry would be to erect
signs on both sides of every intersection along one of the roads.
The signs would say "Stop" or "Yield." One might think the suc-
cess of these signs is due entirely to the content of their message.
But the labeling of the road creates an independent focal effect.'To
illustrate, suppose the signs are illegible. Or suppose that someone
erects not signs but large green poles along one road on both sides
of the intersection. Assume also that the drivers can always tell as
they approach an intersection whether their road is the one with
green poles.
By labeling the environment, the green poles create an asymme-
try in the players: One is a driver on the green-poled road, the
other is not. If the game is played only once, the asymmetry is
probably irrelevant. Though the green poles make one road "stand
out," it could be entirely unclear to the players whether the poles
suggest that the drivers on that road have priority or that the driv-
ers on that road should yield."n But if the game is recurrent, the
asymmetry matters. It gives rise to two new strategies:124
(4) yield when on a road with green poles and maintain speed
otherwise; and
(5) maintain speed when on a road with green poles and yield
otherwise.
Once these strategies exist, the existing equilibrium is no longer
stable. If, by accident, the probability of a driver playing Hawk
123 The green poles may make one road more salient than the other. This would
solve a problem, like the meeting-place problem, where coordination requires two
parties selecting the same road. But here, coordination requires different actions by
the parties. Highlighting one road leaves open the question of which action (Yield or
Maintain Speed) should occur on that road. One might reason that markers indicate
who should alter the status quo, which means yield; conversely, markers might
indicate the "privileged" road to which drivers on other roads should yield. But if the
drivers share the right expectations, the poles might help coordination even in a single
instance of the game. My point in the text is that they do not have to, and assuming
they don't, there is still a labeling effect that occurs when the game is repeated.
12, These are in addition to the original three strategies: (1) Maintain speed; (2)
Yield; and (3) Maintain speed with probability h and Yield with probability (1 - h),
where 0 < h < 1.
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when on the green-poled road rises above 1/3, then the payoff from
playing Dove when one is not on the green-poled road also rises.
Conversely, if some random event causes the probability of a
driver playing Dove when on the green-poled road to rise above
2/3, the payoff from playing Hawk when one is not on the green-
poled road also rises. Regardless of whether these green poles ini-
tially "mean" anything to any drivers, it is likely that evolutionary
processes would produce an equilibrium where everyone plays
Strategy 4 or Strategy 5. Green poles break the symmetry and pro-
duce a new equilibrium in which there are no collisions.
The relevance of this analysis to the present discussion is that
law provides one means of labeling the players or other elements in
a strategic situation and thereby creating common, knowledge of
asymmetries. In the Crossroads game, the state can serve as the
third party that erects the physical objects-green poles or yield
signs-that break the symmetry. More likely, the state erects signs
that say "Stop" or "Yield," and enacts a law requiring compliance
with such signs. The result is to create a focal point influencing the
choice between Strategy 4 and Strategy 5. But the key here is that
expressive law changes the equilibrium only because labeling first
creates two new possible equilibria. At that point, the existing
equilibrium is unstable and the focal power of law helps to deter-
mine which stable equilibrium is selected, guiding the processes of
adaptive learning in the direction of a particular convention.
At this point, I should acknowledge that asymmetries abound in
the real world. Because there are few genuinely symmetric situa-
tions, the labeling potential of law might seem to be trivial.
Notwithstanding natural asymmetries, however, the analysis here is
quite general. Individuals often play the game as if it were symmet-
ric because, when asymmetries are sufficiently abundant, an
individual ignores all of them.
The Crossroads game, for example, offers too many asymme-
tries. A few factors creating asymmetries are the size, make, model,
color, and age of the two cars; the size, direction, and names of the
two streets; the weather, date, day, and time. Switching to a more
successful strategy means that one must first identify the alternative
strategies. Possible strategies include not just playing Hawk when
on the right, but playing Hawk when on the larger street, when on
the alphabetically prior street, when in the larger car, or when driv-
[Vol. 86:16491706
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ing a Ford. There are also permutations of simple strategies, like
"Play Hawk when one is on the right in a blue car on an odd num-
bered or rainy day or when traveling north, and Dove otherwise,
except always play Dove when the other car is yellow." More trou-
bling yet are time-sensitive strategies: "Play Hawk when on the
right and Dove when on the left before July 1, 2002 and thereafter
play Dove when on the right and Hawk when on the left." As a
purely logical matter, the number of strategies is infinite."
For the sake of argument, suppose that the number of asymme-
tries (and therefore strategies) is not infinite, but merely very large.
What will players do when they know there are a very large num-
ber of asymmetries in the recurrent situation?'26 Let's assume that
individuals must incur a cost of time and effort to collect the data
on any particular asymmetry. Drivers passing through an intersec-
tion must give scarce attention to the presence of asymmetries.
Drivers without perfect memory or computational skills must ex-
pend effort trying to detect the play patterns associated with
asymmetries.
These costs have a dramatic effect. Now an individual may ra-
tionally decide not to allocate any time or effort to studying any of
the asymmetries. The problem is that no one can know in advance
which asymmetry will turn out to matter. That is, given that the in-
stability of the current mixed equilibrium arises from random
perturbations, no one can predict which asymmetry a future con-
vention will exploit. The investment in data collection for
asymmetries that turn out not to matter is wasted. Because there
are so many asymmetries, the cost of investigating all the strategies
based on them can easily exceed the benefits." The alternative cost
115 Sugden uses this observation (based on what philosophers call the problem of
induction) to question whether rationality alone can explain strategy selection during
disequilibrium. See Sugden, supra note 36.
12 If individuals were perfectly rational and the costs of collecting data on all the
asymmetries were zero, then a convention would certainly emerge. Eventually,
random perturbations would cause a deviation from the mixed equilibrium along
some asymmetry; all the players would immediately notice the greater benefits of
playing a strategy based on that asymmetry.
"I The benefits of collecting data on all possible strategies is at most the discounted
value of the difference in continuing to play the current strategy and switching to the
better strategy one would learn by investigating all the possibilities. But this
overstates the benefit if one can expect to free ride off the investigations of others. A
player may know that, even without investigating the asymmetries, he will notice once
everyone else begins to follow a pure-strategy equilibrium-a convention. In other
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of investigating just one strategy is less, but so is the expected
benefit, because the one strategy investigated will probably be un-
related to the convention that emerges. To clarify, assume that c is
the cost of investigating one asymmetry and there are n asymme-
tries. Assume that b is the expected benefit derived from playing a
new strategy based on some asymmetry." The individual rationally
chooses not to investigate all the asymmetries if the value of nc ex-
ceeds the discounted value of b. If, as discounted, nc > b, then c >
b/n, so that it will not pay for an individual to investigate any sin-
gle, randomly selected, asymmetry. If the players rationally choose
to ignore asymmetries, they will not notice that the payoffs from a
strategy based on some asymmetry exceed their existing payoffs. A
mixed equilibrium is therefore stable in the face of asymmetries
when the cost of investigating strategies based on the asymmetries
exceeds the expected benefits.
Viewing the situation globally, the players face a "second-order"
coordination problem. The players have a common interest in
reaching a pure-strategy equilibrium that avoids all the costly
Hawk/Hawk outcomes. They can be said to have a common inter-
est in finding some asymmetry that will facilitate such a pure-
strategy equilibrium or convention. In the Crossroads game, all
drivers would like to share the "right" to proceed through intersec-
tions according to some asymmetry in the situation that everyone
can recognize. The problem is that no one wants to incur the costs
of investigating all the salient asymmetries and, though everyone is
willing to incur the costs of investigating just one asymmetry, as-
suming it is the same asymmetry everyone else investigates, no one
knows what asymmetry others will investigate. The coordination
problem being described arises at a higher level than that described
in the one-shot version of the game. The first-order coordination
problem arises from each player not knowing what behavior to ex-
pect from the other in a single iteration of the game. The second-
order coordination problem arises from not knowing on which
words, he won't detect the initially small gains from adopting a strategy that exploits
some asymmetry unless he expends resources "investigating" the asymmetry. But he
will inevitably notice that everyone else switches to playing the same pure strategy.
Thus, his loss from not investigating asymmetries is limited to the time before he
notices everyone else has switched to the same pure strategy.
128 For reasons stated supra note 127, this benefit may be limited by the time it takes
to notice everyone else has switched to the same pure-strategy equilibrium.
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asymmetry to focus for purposes of creating a convention to solve
the first-order problem. As a result, no asymmetry is focal, so no
one investigates anything, and no convention emerges.
As law solved the first-order coordination problem, it solves this
second-order problem by focusing attention on a particular asym-
metry. Law works by making focal the asymmetry the law
embodies. Once an asymmetry is salient, law then works as with
one-shot games to make a particular solution focal. Thus, what I
have termed as the law's labeling function is merely the focal-point
function as applied to the second-order coordination problem. The
law solves the second-order problem by highlighting one asymme-
try and then solves the first-order problem by highlighting one part
of that asymmetry. In both respects, law works as a focal point.
Thus, when a publicized law says, "At Crossroads, yield to the
fight," it first focuses attention on the left/fight asymmetry, making
that asymmetry the focal solution to the second-order coordination
problem. Because this asymmetry now "sticks out" from all the
others, one can expect others to use it to create a convention."9 By
saying "yield to the fight," the legal rule advances a particular
"side" of the asymmetry. This effect addresses the first-order coor-
dination problem: Given that everyone is focusing on the left/fight
asymmetry, should everyone yield to the left or to the fight? The
legal rule focuses attention on one solution and will likely produce
the expressed convention-here, yielding to cars on the fight. But
law has this latter effect only because it first destabilized the exist-
ing equilibrium by focusing attention on a particular asymmetry."l
19 If everyone else is paying attention to this asymmetry, the individual's expected
benefits from collecting data on it now rise dramatically and may easily exceed the
costs. Given perturbations, adaptive learning will produce a pure-strategy convention.
1- Some may object to my analysis that the left/right asymmetry is naturally unique
in certain ways, so that, in this particular example, law is not strictly necessary to
create a convention based on the asymmetry. As an empirical matter, I believe this is
false (because not all societies have the left/right convention). In any event, I used the
Crossroads game just for continuity. Another traffic problem may better illustrate
why natural asymmetries are often not salient. In the "Passing game," two drivers
head toward each other in different lanes of a two-lane road. Each driver wishes to
pass a slower vehicle in her lane, but because passing opportunities are scarce
(visibility often being limited), only one driver can pass safely. Although there are
abundant natural asymmetries-as those based on the size, model, and color of the
cars involved, the weather, date, day, and time, and the direction each is traveling-
there is no left/right asymmetry. None of the natural asymmetries is likely to be focal.
But the state can create a salient asymmetry by drawing two yellow lines down the
middle of the road in what it considers to be safe passing zones. On one side, the line
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In sum, labeling theory gives a rational-choice explanation for
how law might change behavior just by describing it. By creating or
publicizing asymmetries, law can create additional strategies and,
as a result, new possible equilibria. Evolutionary processes could
then drive behavior to one of these new equilibria, perhaps aided
by the focal power of law.
c. Clarifying: Using Regulation to Clarify an Asymmetry and
Supplant an Existing Mixed- or Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
The final point is that regulation can "clarify" an asymmetry.
The players may fail to base strategies on an asymmetry only be-
cause it remains somewhat "fuzzy." If law clarifies the asymmetry,
the players may then choose to play strategies based on it. The re-
sult might be to displace the current state-either a mixed
equilibrium or pure-strategy equilibrium based on a different
asymmetry. Most importantly, the new convention could be more
efficient than the old.
I will illustrate the point assuming there already is a convention
in place. For this purpose, I will introduce some efficiency consid-
erations to the Crossroads game. Suppose that it minimizes total
travel time if drivers on smaller roads yield to drivers on larger
roads."' If all intersections involved an obviously larger and smaller
road, we can imagine a convention spontaneously arising in which
everyone follows the strategy, "Maintain speed when on the larger
road and yield when on the smaller road." But, of course, some-
times two roads of equal size intersect. If it were sufficiently easy to
ascertain at an intersection if one is on a larger, smaller, or equal
sized road, a convention might spontaneously arise in which every-
one followed the strategy, "Maintain speed when on the larger
road at unequal intersections or when on the right at equal inter-
is broken; on the other side, the line is solid. The state need not even announce which
kind of line-solid or broken-indicates passing priority. Just the fact that everyone
knows that everyone notices this asymmetry creates two new strategies worth
investigating: (1) pass with the broken line and yield with the solid line; and (2) pass
with the solid line and yield with the broken line. Of course the state probably would
announce a rule favoring one of these strategies and that would probably make that
particular strategy focal.
3 Assume that more cars travel on the bigger road. On average, then, a car that
slows down on a big road causes more trailing cars to slow down than a car traveling
on a small road.
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sections; yield when on the smaller road at unequal intersections or
when on the left at equal intersections."
But suppose, realistically, that road size varies continuously. At
many intersections, the differences in road size are sufficiently
small that the drivers make lots of mistakes about whether they are
in fact on a larger, smaller, or equal sized road. Thus, road size pre-
sents an asymmetry but it is a "fuzzy" asymmetry. As a result,
those who attempt to play strategies involving the size of the road
find themselves involved in collisions caused by driver mistakes
about comparative road size. Adjudication can sometimes solve
this sort of problem by clarifying the facts in a particular case. But
adjudication is impractical when the whole point is to allow one
driver to drive through the intersection without even slowing
down. Thus, we may imagine that the equilibrium that emerges is
one that avoids relying on the fuzzy asymmetry. Suppose what
emerges is a convention relying only on the very clear left/right
asymmetry: "Always yield to the car on the right." This avoids col-
lisions from Hawk/Hawk interactions and from mistakes, though it
does not minimize travel time.
Now introduce the state. Suppose that after the "yield to the car
on the right" convention emerges, the government physically
marks intersections where different sized roads meet. Specifically,
the state places green poles on one road of an intersection if, and
only if, the intersecting roads are of significantly different size. It
does not matter if they are placed on the larger or smaller road as
long as they are placed consistently on one or the other and are
visible to drivers approaching the intersection on either road. Now
we have removed the problem of misidentifying the kind of inter-
section. By labeling 'the intersections into two types-those
involving equal sized roads and those involving unequal sized
roads-the state has turned a fuzzy asymmetry into clear one. This
fact alone can guide the drivers to a new equilibrium, one that cul-
minates in a convention that produces one equilibrium behavior at
green-poled intersections and another at other intersections. Spe-
cifically, labeling enables conventions in which drivers yield (1) at
green-poled intersections (of unequal sized roads) depending on
the size of the road they are on and (2) at other intersections, ac-
cording to whether they are on the left or right. The law's focal
final effect will likely guide behavior to the prescribed convention.
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If the law proclaims, "At green poles, yield to the car on the bigger
road and at other intersections yield to the car on the right," it can
produce a convention more efficient than was otherwise possible.
This convention avoids collisions-from Hawk/Hawk interactions
and mistakes-and minimizes travel time. As with all the effects
discussed here, the law produces this result without the threat of
sanctions.
Legal rules are often accompanied by signs that proclaim the
rule. The conventional understanding of these signs is merely that
they publicize the law: This is where the right to park your car
ends, here is where you may not smoke, and so on. But the analysis
here shows that these physical markings have a more direct effect,
one not dependent on legal sanctions. The state can influence how
two private parties interact merely by labeling the physical space in
which they interact. Private landowners undoubtedly have the
same power, so that law is not always necessary to produce this ef-
fect. Nonetheless, a comprehensive positive theory of legal
compliance should include this expressive dimension.
The law's ability to influence behavior by labeling is not, how-
ever, limited to the labeling of physical spaces. The law also
directly labels individuals. Think of the huge variety of legal cate-
gories that the law places on persons: state actor, private citizen,
spouse, parent, minor, owner, fiduciary, employee, merchant, fran-
chisee, landlord, felon, and so on. In each of these cases, the law
may "clarify" an ambiguous asymmetry. Intended or not, the effect
of a clarification is to change the payoffs from strategies that at-
tempt to exploit the asymmetry. The fact that law gives a specific
meaning to a term like "parent" or "spouse," for example, un-
doubtedly affects private interactions not subject to any legal
sanction. They make it more likely that we will observe pure-
strategy equilibria-conventions-arising in private settings of em-
ployment, insurance, or medical decisionmaking, that involve these
defined relationships. Because the state selects one of many ways
of defining the term, and also provides adjudication to clarify par-
ticular cases, individuals can rely on the clarified concept in
selecting their strategies. As in the above examples, clarification
may attract more people to use the strategy and/or decrease the
number of "mistakes" among those who already use the strategy.
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In some cases, the state probably intends its legal definitions to
have this expressive effect on interactions between individuals. Ra-
cial definitions in the Jim Crow South are an example. Prior to the
statutory definitions, there were already race-based conventions
and norms." To some degree, the conventions exploited asymme-
tries in physical appearance. But physical appearances differ
continuously among individuals, particularly given that many have
parents of mixed races.'33 A vivid illustration of the resulting ambi-
guity is the fact that some people regarded as "Negro" were
nonetheless able to "pass" as white." In this context, clarifying the
racial category by statutory definitions facilitated conventions based
on race. Today, there is still debate over whether the government's
definitions of racial categories, for purposes of affirmative action or
the census, have the same effect, intended or not.
As with the physical marking of space, private individuals or insti-
tutions might be able to clarify the concepts that label individuals.
But in some cases the state retains the advantages of publicity and
uniqueness. That is, the media may carry further the state's defini-
tions and the state's message may stand out against a background
of competing private messages. In any event, whether or not the
state has any comparative advantage in clarifying asymmetries use-
ful to solving coordination problems, its legal rules will sometimes
have this expressive effect.
IV. APPLICATIONS: EXPLOrrING THE LAW'S FOCAL EFFECT TO
REGULATE SMOKING AND LANDLORD-TENANT DISPUTES
This final Part provides two extended examples of the focal
point theory, specifically the expressive effect of regulation of pub-
lic smoking and landlord/tenant disputes. These are potentially the
132 See, e.g., C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (3d ed. 1974);
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003,,1036-42 (1995); Robert
J. Cottrol, The Historical Definition of Race Law, 21 L. & Soc'y Rev. 865 (1988).
'3 See, e.g., F. James Davis, Who is Black?: One Nation's Definition (1991); Cheryl
I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707,1737-41 (1993).
134 See, e.g., Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and
Modem Democracy 683-84 (1944); Harris, supra note 133, at 1710-13. There were
also people who self-identified as white but failed the prevailing legal definitions. See
Hams, id. at 1739.
'3 See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on
Insights Gleaned from Trademark Law, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 887, 924-25 (1996).
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most difficult situations for expressive law because the players al-
ready recognize an asymmetry and have already achieved a stable
equilibrium. Nonetheless, I use them to illustrate some of the
claims stated above.
A. The Expressive Effect of a Public Smoking Ban
I previously modeled conflict over smoking as a one-shot Hawk-
Dove game."6 Each player wants to "get his way"-by smoking or
preventing the other from smoking-but each also wants to avoid
an embarrassing "scene" that occurs when both players insist on
getting their way (the Hawk/Hawk outcome). Obviously, this prob-
lem is recurrent, so we should consider it in light of the
evolutionary analysis.
1. An Existing Convention Favoring Smokers
As before, we initially assume there is no government regulation
of smoking. The first thing to note is this asymmetry: Conflict over
smoking arises because one player wants to smoke and the other
wants the first not to smoke, at least not at that moment. Doubt-
lessly, this asymmetry is too obvious not to be noticed. Thus,
Figure 7 models the game as an asymmetric one between a smoker
and a nonsmoker. The players therefore observe that the possible
strategies include "Yield when one is the smoker and insist when
one is the nonsmoker," and "Insist when one is the smoker and
yield when one is the nonsmoker." Assume also that all individuals
decide to "investigate" this asymmetry, meaning they pay attention
to how payoffs vary according to it.'37 Although there remains a
mixed equilibrium in which the probability of a randomly selected
smoker or nonsmoker playing Dove is 2/3, this equilibrium is un-
stable. The only stable equilibria are ones where smokers always
yield and where nonsmokers always yield.
1-See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
,3 Because the smoker/nonsmoker asymmetry is so obvious, each individual expects
that everyone else will pay attention to it. Because everyone expects some convention
to arise out of this asymmetry, it is worthwhile for each individual to "investigate" the
asymmetry. See supra text accompanying notes 122-128.
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Yield 1,1 0, 2
Insist 2,0 -2,-2
FIGURE 7
One might think that there is an important distinction between
this case and the original example involving "possessors" of prop-
erty and their "challengers." The difference is that we may imagine
that everyone possesses some property so that everyone finds that
they are sometimes in the role of possessor and sometimes in the
role of challenger. Most nonsmokers, however, never expect to be
in the position of smoker; many smokers never expect to be in the
position of nonsmoker. But in a game between randomly selected
strangers, this difference will not change the outcome. Suppose you
are a nonsmoker in the original mixed equilibrium and you are
playing the particular mixed strategy of Dove with a 2/3 probability
and Hawk with a 1/3 probability. Suppose you then detect that the
probability that a random smoker will play Dove falls below 2/3.
That means that when you next encounter a smoker, you will in-
crease your expected payoff by playing Dove more than 2/3 of the
time." You may not want the behavior to tip into a new prosmok-
ing convention. But you can't cause it or stop it by your decision
alone, so you maximize your payoffs by increasing your probability
of Dove."9 As the equilibrium changes, you eventually play Dove
all the time."0
13 When the probability that a random smoker will play Dove is 2/3, then your
expected return from playing Hawk is 2/3 ((2/3)(2) + 1/3(-2)) and from playing Dove
is 2/3 ((2/3)(1) + 1/3(0)). So you have no reason to alter your existing strategy. But
when the probability that a random smoker will play Dove falls from 0.67 to 0.6, your
expected return from playing Hawk is 0.4 ((0.6)(2) + (0.4)(-2)) and from playing Dove
is 0.6 ((0.6)(1) + (0.4)(0)). So you are better off switching to Dove in every case.
139 Here we see that there is a cooperation problem among nonsmokers who want to
resist evolution toward a prosmoking convention. If nonsmokers could cooperate in
playing Hawk for some time period, they could block the new convention and instead
produce an antismoking convention (assuming smokers do not also solve their
collective action problem). The gains to each nonsmoker might exceed the costs of
always playing Hawk during the mixed equilibrium. But the dominant strategy is to
free ride, to gain the benefits of other nonsmokers playing Hawk without bearing any
of the costs.
4 The example illustrates how evolutionary game theory could explain the creation
of oppressive conventions or norms of partiality that allow some class of individuals to
benefit over time at the expense of others. See Russell Hardin, One for All: The
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Real world conventions are usually more complex. This com-
plexity arises because individuals notice additional asymmetries
that create further possible strategies. For example, they may no-
tice obvious differences in the place where smoking/nonsmoking
occurs: indoors vs. outdoors, the smoker's property vs. the non-
smoker's property, a restaurant vs. a hospital. Or they may notice
less obvious differences in circumstances: when one player is in-
toxicated, recovering from grief, or suffering a respiratory ailment.
A smoker might decide to play Hawk outdoors and Dove indoors.
A nonsmoker might play Hawk unless the smoker is intoxicated or
grief-stricken. The willingness to play such strategies may be af-
fected by the fact that the payoffs may differ slightly in each
situation (but in every case still presenting a Hawk-Dove game).
The result may be a complex convention. Instead of a uniform out-
come where either smokers or nonsmokers always yield, we get an
equilibrium in which smokers always play Hawk in certain situa-
tions and Dove in others, and nonsmokers do the opposite.
Let us call a combination of time, place, and/or circumstance in
which a convention arises a "context." The overall smoking con-
vention may be complex, but let us assume that, within a given
context, the only stable equilibria are ones in which smokers always
yield or nonsmokers always yield. In other words, each context has
a separate convention and each convention takes the form either
that smokers smoke as they please (without objection) or that
smokers ask permission, which nonsmokers refuse as they please
(without objection).
Now consider the specific context of passenger waiting areas in
airport terminals. When individuals enter the waiting area, their
first "move" is to decide where to sit (based on factors like prox-
imity to the gate). Once they select a seat, smokers and
nonsmokers pair up and play a Hawk-Dove game to determine
whether that area will be used for smoking. Suppose that the cur-
rent airport convention is for smokers to play Hawk and
nonsmokers to play Dove. Will it then matter if the state desig-
Logic of Group Conflict (1995); Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 7, at 134-97. As note
139 indicates, the convention creates a cooperation problem for the oppressed
because, acting collectively, they might be able to displace the convention, but each
individual is best off free riding on the efforts of -others. Dennis Chong uses this
framework to analyze the American civil rights movement of the 1950s and 60s. See
Chong, supra note 6.
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nates certain areas of airport terminals as "nonsmoking" and pro-
hibits smoking in these areas? The law does create a new
asymmetry between smoking and nonsmoking areas. It does there-
fore create the new strategies of playing Hawk in one location and
Dove in the other, and a focal point of nonsmokers playing Hawk
only in no-smoking sections. But there is a potential problem. The
day before the state bans smoking in designated areas, 100% of
smokers played Hawk in these (and all other) areas. The day after
the ban, unless the law threatens sanctions, why would anyone ex-
pect anything different from smokers? If smokers will play Hawk
100% of the time, even in nonsmoking areas, then it does not pay
for nonsmokers to challenge them. Indeed, given the payoffs of
Figure 7, as long as more than 1/3 of smokers play Hawk in a given
context, it pays for nonsmokers to play Dove more than 2/3 of the
time. Adaptive learning would then push behavior back to the con-
vention where smokers always play Hawk and nonsmokers always
play Dove.
2. Exploiting the Focal Effect to Upset the Pro-Smoking
Equilibrium
Notwithstanding the existing convention, antismoking laws may
generate compliance without the threat of legal sanctions. The
starting point is to realize that rationality alone does not require
that individuals follow the existing convention, which is to say, the
pattern of play of the recent past. As discussed above, a prior equi-
librium-all smokers play Hawk-merely provides a focal point for
future play.4' But law now provides a competing focal point. Once
the law says "no smoking in designated areas," there is one equilib-
rium that is focal because of past precedent and another
equilibrium that is focal because of the publicity and uniqueness of
legal expression. Which equilibrium will emerge-which is more
focal-is entirely an empirical question.
By itself, this merely says that the outcome is difficult to predict.
But that is itself highly significant. Ignoring the focal point effect,
we would predict a priori that a sanctionless law would have no ef-
fect. But given the focal point effect, it becomes an empirical
question. Moreover, there is an additional reason to believe that
4 See supra text accompanying note 120.
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the law will upset the equilibrium. The physical markings of no-
smoking zones are likely to cause behavioral changes. This labeling
effect gives additional power to the "competing focal point" the
law provides.
a. The Labeling of Public Spaces Changes Public Behavior
Note how the state's labeling of seating space as "no-smoking"
alters the game. As stated above, when players enter the airport
terminal, their first move is to decide where to sit. After that, if
there is conflict between people sitting near each other, the indi-
viduals involved play a Hawk-Dove game. Before the state
designates separate smoking and no-smoking sections, this prior
move involves identifying the most attractive available seat or ran-
domly selecting between equally attractive available seats.
The state's labeling of seating sections alters the behavior of the
players at this first stage. Nonsmokers will now flock to the non-
smoking area. For the nonsmokers, the situation is a meeting-place
problem. They all prefer to sit near other nonsmokers, but being
strangers, they don't know where to meet each other. The legal la-
beling has solved this problem by effectively saying, "Nonsmokers
meet here." Smokers, however, are indifferent as to where they sit
because we assume (because the equilibrium is stable) that, wher-
ever they sit, they expect to play Hawk to any nonsmoker's Dove.
Nonetheless, there will still be a higher proportion of nonsmokers
in the nonsmoking section because they will seek out that section
while smokers select seats randomly. Moreover, if the nonsmoking
section consists (initially) of only a few relatively undesirable seats,
then there will be greater separation, possibly even complete seg-
regation. Smokers will avoid these seats because they are
undesirable; those who bother with such seats will be nonsmokers
seeking to avoid smokers. For example, suppose there are 50 pas-
sengers, 10 of whom smoke, and 100 seats, the least desirable 25 of
which (because they are farthest from the gate) are designated
"no-smoking." It is easy to imagine that no smoker chooses to en-
ter the no-smoking area merely because there are better seats
available. Quite possibly then, the mere labeling of seats produces
1718 [Vol. 86:1649
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what appears to be substantial or complete compliance with the
new law.'
At this point, labeling has produced significant behavioral
change. Even if smokers ignore the no-smoking rule, smokers still
tend to congregate in the smoking section simply because non-
smokers avoid such seats. Thus, even absent the threat of legal
sanctions, the rule generates some compliance, possibly even full
compliance. Nonetheless, the compliance is fragile. Nothing has
changed the basic equilibrium-that smokers play Hawk-so if the
game is unavoidable, the outcome remains the same. If there is a
shortage of seats, for example, then most smokers will not hesitate
to sit in the nonsmoking section and smoke. Nonsmokers will not
"enforce" the rule against smoking in no-smoking sections.
b. Combining Behavioral Change and Competing Focal Power
Now consider how this behavioral change-the separation of
smokers and nonsmokers--combines with the focal competition ef-
fect first discussed. When behavior changes, there is a stronger
reason for doubting the focal power of the prior equilibrium. The
142 If one complicates the game a bit, to make it more realistic, the tendency to
separate smokers and nonsmokers becomes even more pronounced. Because payoffs
vary continuously among players, it is likely there will be at least a few for whom the
game being played is not Hawk-Dove. I previously derived the payoffs for
Hawk/Hawk by imagining that a player who "fights" wins half the time but that half
the payoff from winning (the expected gains from fighting) was exceeded by the costs
of fighting. But if the players are heterogeneous, there will be some for whom half the
payoffs from winning will exceed the costs of fighting (or, more generally, for whom
the probability of winning times the benefits of getting one's way is greater than the
expected cost of engaging in a fight). For these individuals, Hawk is the dominant
strategy and they will play it regardless of what they expect the other to do. Thus,
some smokers and nonsmokers will always play Hawk because their costs from
fighting are unusually low or their benefits from, respectively, smoking or avoiding
smoke are so high. Let us call such players "cranks," though the term does not mean
the players like to fight, but merely that their payoffs make it rational to fight.
In the existing equilibrium, the existence of smoking cranks does not affect the
play of ordinary nonsmokers (that is, the noncranks) because they always defer to any
smoker. But the existence of nonsmoking cranks alters the analysis. Nonsmoking
cranks will, like all nonsmokers, congregate in the nonsmoking area. (Though such
cranks play Hawk when confronted with a smoker, they still prefer to avoid exposure
to cigarette smoke without having to incur the costs of a fight.) Smokers, whether
cranks or not, will in turn prefer to avoid the costs of encountering a nonsmoking
crank. Knowing that most nonsmoking cranks are in the no-smoking section, all
smokers now have a reason to avoid that section. The difference in expected costs
may be small because the number of cranks is low. But even a small reason will
contribute to added separation of smokers and nonsmokers.
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law does not merely highlight the alternative equilibrium by its
formal message-"don't smoke here." The law also creates a situa-
tion where very little smoking occurs in the new no-smoking
section. Thus, we now have formally "new" spaces-smoking and
no-smoking-and fairly effective segregation-most of the people
in the no-smoking section are nonsmokers. When players observe
the new message and the new segregation of behavior, they have a
significant reason to wonder whether past precedent predicts fu-
ture play-that is, to wonder whether the convention that
governed the airport before formal and effective segregation is the
best predictor of what will now occur with formal and effective seg-
regation.
The players may also consider the relevance of other prevailing
smoking conventions. Suppose that in this society, nonsmokers
play Hawk in certain other contexts-say in hospitals and movie
theaters. Previously, a nonsmoking convention that governed some
"other context" did not seem at all predictive of behavior in the
airport context. But now these places may seem to have much in
common with the designated no-smoking section of the airport.
These contexts may now seem more relevant for predicting airport
behavior than is the prior airport convention.
In short, after the law produces some apparent behavioral com-
pliance, players may no longer see this "game" as the same one to
which the prior convention applied. The precedent of the "old"
game-that smokers play Hawk in airports-still exerts influence;
it offers a focal point. But the law and the observed behavior in
airports (and possibly other contexts) create a focal point for non-
smokers to play Hawk in no-smoking sections. The latter focal
point may be strong enough to change expectations about the
strategies smokers and nonsmokers will play, which would change
what strategies are played. If nonsmokers play Hawk in these sec-
tions in sufficient numbers, they will establish a new pure-strategy
equilibrium, a convention against smoking. Then the compliance
with the law will no longer be fragile; even without legal sanctions,
it is enforced by second-party sanctions."3
1'43It is worth noting here that other factors can interact with the described
expressive effect. If the law is initially enforced by sanctions, for example, that fact
could itself suffice to create an expectation that smokers will play Dove in the no-
smoking section. At that point, the nonsmokers will begin to play Hawk, the new
1720 [Vol. 86:1649
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Finally, note how the state can act incrementally. The above
analysis assumed that the no-smoking section initially consists of
only a few relatively undesirable seats. The fewer and less desirable
the seats, the greater the probability that all the people sitting in
the seats are nonsmokers who selfishly comply with the law. The
greater the apparent level of compliance, the starker the contrast
from previously observed behavior. Once this contrast disrupts the
prior equilibrium in the manner described, the state can enlarge
the no-smoking section and include more desirable seats. The ex-
pectations are linked to what seats are designated no-smoking. So
everyone will continue to expect nonsmokers to play Hawk in all
parts of the no-smoking section, even as that section increases in
size.
In perhaps the penultimate stage, the no-smoking section is the
whole airport terminal except for a small section of relatively un-
desirable seats that now constitute the "smoking" section. The final
stage is to ban smoking entirely. Nonsmokers will continue to play
Hawk unless, as claimed above, this shift in the game is so radical
that it creates doubt about how well past play predicts future play.
But unlike the law that first created no-smoking sections, here the
precedent of existing convention and the law point in the same di-
rection. At first, the law worked toward creating an expectation
that nonsmokers will play Hawk in a given area, an expectation at
odds with past practice. Now the existing equilibrium is that non-
smokers play Hawk in the no-smoking area. When the law declares
the whole airport terminal nonsmoking, both the law (no smoking
in designated areas) and the past practice (no smoking in desig-
nated areas) work in favor of nonsmokers playing Hawk
throughout the airport. Of course, past practice also favored smok-
ers playing Hawk in smoking areas, but now they cannot find any
such place. The law works at this final stage by creating a meeting-
convention emerges, and the law is self-enforcing. Or the focal effect may interact
with other expressive effects. For example, elsewhere I argue that people are
motivated to avoid even the silent disapproval of others. See McAdams, supra note 5.
A smoker might consider the silent disapproval of surrounding nonsmokers to be a
cost. The simple fact that nonsmokers are concentrated in the no-smoking section
means a smoker faces higher costs from smoking there. Again, if this cost is sufficient
to cause smokers to switch to a Dove strategy in the no-smoking section, then the
nonsmokers will begin to play Hawk. Once that occurs, the new nonsmoking
convention will emerge. The law will then be enforced not merely by concern for
avoiding silent disapproval, but also by the desire to aVoid a costly scene.
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place problem for smokers; they can no longer find a concentration
of smokers where they expect smokers to play Hawk. Hence, they
play Dove. Again, the law produces significant behavioral change
without threatening sanctions.
B. The Expressive Effect of a Landlord Liability Law
Thus far, I have explored the focal power of law through
thought experiments that abstract away from legal sanctions. In my
final example (added after Professor Wax completed her Com-
ment'"), however, I isolate the expressive power of law in a
different way. I examine the situation where legal sanctions exist,
but are imperfect. In many real-world cases, liability fails to make
compliance a dominant strategy. Instead, legal sanctions may only
succeed in creating a Hawk-Dove game, or in changing the
Hawk/Hawk payoffs in an existing Hawk-Dove game. Where this
is true, the focal power of law may provide the critical last step to
produce compliance. In other words, where the law is imperfect, its
expressive function is a complement to its sanction function; to-
gether, they may produce a behavioral change that neither can
accomplish alone.
Real world legal sanctions produce only imperfect deterrence.
Consider private liability rules. Because legal enforcement is
costly, an individual will sometimes decide not to bring a lawsuit he
is legally entitled to win because the expected litigation costs are
not worth the expected gains. The gains depend on the court sys-
tem correctly identifying his claim as meritorious, but the inherent
fallibility of judicial fact-finding means that every deserving plain-
tiff (like every deserving defendant) runs some risk of failure. The
litigation costs potentially include not only (1) attorney fees, (2)
court costs, and (3) the opportunity costs of one's time, but (4) the
risk of extra-legal retaliation by the defendant, and (5) possible
damage to one's reputation among third parties. The law attempts
to protect plaintiffs from retaliation, but again, the fallibility of
fact-finding means that defendants will sometimes escape liability
for such actions. The reputational problem is that third parties may
regard someone who initiates a lawsuit as a "troublemaker"-one
See Amy Wax, Expressive Law and Oppressive Norms: A Comment on Richard
McAdams's "A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law," 86 Va. L. Rev.'1731 (2000).
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situated to gain unusually high benefits from litigation or to incur
unusually low costs.
These imperfections are familiar. We know that law sometimes
fails to make the enforcement of legal rights a dominant strategy.
What I wish to show is that we can plausibly model such imperfec-
tions by using a Hawk-Dove game. For certain classes of legal
wrongs, the potential plaintiff's expected value for litigating even a
meritorious claim is negative. The expected value for the potential
defendant is also negative. As a result, litigation is just another
form of "fighting" which tends to make both parties worse off.
Both parties prefer an outcome where they insist on getting their
way and the other party defers, so they can win the conflict without
incurring the costs of a Hawk-Hawk outcome. In this situation,
there are two equilibria: (1) one in which potential plaintiffs play
Hawk by enforcing their rights in court, while potential defendants
play Dove; and (2) one in which potential defendants play Hawk
while potential plaintiffs play Dove and the legal rights remain un-
enforced. Given these possibilities, anything that makes one
equilibrium focal will help to create the expectations that bring
about that equilibrium. Law may work by making focal the equilib-
rium in which potential plaintiffs assert their rights.
The context of landlord-tenant disputes provides a useful illus-
tration. Specifically, consider a new local ordinance or judicial
decision creating liability for landlords for "unreasonable" entry
upon the tenant's rental property. I will identify the law's separate
expressive and sanction effects by comparing the payoffs before
and after the law creates the new liability. Figure 8 provides the







Column player is a Landlord who gains utility from being able to
have access to the rented property at all hours of the day. Row
player is a Tenant who loses utility from the risk of Landlord's en-
try, particularly at certain hours. I address below the significance of
J
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the parties' lease contract for their behavior. For now, note that
each individual can play one of two strategies. As in a Hawk-Dove
game, there is an aggressive strategy and a passive strategy. How-
ever, because the game is not formally Hawk-Dove (for reasons
explained below), I will call the strategies "Insist" and "Defer. 145
Landlord plays Insist by demanding the ability to enter the prop-
erty at any hour; Tenant plays Insist by demanding privacy from
such entry. Either can instead play a passive Defer strategy that al-
lows the other to do as he or she wishes.
If both play Defer, they reach a compromise in which each re-
ceives only part of what he or she wants; the payoff for each is 1.
Compared to this baseline, each player gains by playing Insist
against the other's Defer (4) and loses by playing Defer against In-
sist (-2). If both play the aggressive strategy, they "fight," as before,
by having either a physical altercation or a heated verbal confron-
tation. (We might also include in "fighting" various forms of "self-
help" property destruction.) It is possible that the negative payoffs
from this confrontation will be equal for both sides, but I have here
included unequal payoffs. The payoffs in the lower right cell of
Figure 8 might reflect that Landlord is more likely than Tenant to
"win" a fight or that Landlord will suffer less from the fight
whether he or she wins or loses. Given these payoffs, Landlord is
better off playing Insist no matter what Tenant does. The outcome
is a convention that Landlords enter their rented premises when-
ever they wish. Because Landlord has a dominant strategy, the
game is technically not Hawk-Dove.
Now consider the fact that the two parties have a contract. This
complication need not alter the payoff matrix of Figure 8, but re-
quires that we reinterpret it. When the contract allocates the
Landlord a right of access, the Landlord's Insist strategy now con-
sists of demanding his contract rights, while the Defer strategy
consists of waiving those rights. In the same situation, the Tenant's
Insist strategy consists of demanding a contract waiver while Defer
means yielding to the Landlord's contractual rights.'46 Finally, the
Insist/Insist outcome now is (or includes) a lawsuit. Thus, legal li-
'45 Here I borrow Eric Posner's "Insist/Defer" terminology. See Posner, Evolution
of Constitutions, supra note 3.
46When the contract denies access to the Landlord, the opposite interpretations
apply.
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ability merely creates another form of fighting: Instead of physical
violence, property destruction, or verbal confrontation, the parties
can litigate. Litigation is costly for all the reasons noted above; in
particular it risks retaliation and loss of reputation (litigious ten-
ants and landlords being considered "troublemakers" others wish
to avoid). Thus, it remains plausible that the expected outcome for
each party is negative. We can imagine circumstances where the
expected payoff from litigation is the same (-5, -1) as that from
nonlegal forms of fighting. If so, the Landlord's dominant strategy
is still Insist; the only equilibrium is Defer/Insist. Regardless of
what the contract says, landlords enter their rented .premises
whenever they wish.
Now assume that a legislature or court decides it ought to deter
landlords from entering rental property at "unreasonable" times.
To accomplish this end, the state imposes significant civil sanctions
for landlords who enter rented property at times other than those
specified. (For simplicity, assume also that the tenant cannot waive
his right to be free from these unreasonable entries.) As a result,
we get the payoff matrix in Figure 9. Nothing has changed from the
first three cells of Figure 8 because there is no invocation of law if
either or both parties defer. But the fourth cell changes because
the new legal sanctions affect the expected outcome for In-
sist/Insist. If the new sanctions had the intended effect, they would
create a situation in which tenants all had a dominant strategy of
Insist and landlords therefore always avoided "unreasonable" en-
try (for example, by reversing the payoffs from -5, -1 to -1, -5). In
keeping with the theme of this example, however, I assume that the
new legal sanctions are imperfect. A tenant who initiates a merito-
rious suit still incurs various costs and, because of legal error, runs
the risk of losing. We can therefore plausibly imagine that even for
a deserving Tenant the expected value of litigating is still negative
(and still worse than any other outcome). The new legal sanctions
do, however, improve matters for Tenant, raising his expected In-
sist/Insist outcome from -5 to -3. At the same time, legal liability
causes Landlord's expected Insist/Insist outcome to fall from -1 to
-3.
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On this view, real-world law has failed to do what perfect law
would do, which is to make Defer a dominant strategy for Land-
lord, thereby eliminating unreasonable entry. Instead, the sanctions
have merely created a Hawk-Dove game. There are now two possi-
ble equilibria-Insist/Defer and Defer/Insist. In the former
equilibrium, law "succeeds"; in the latter, the law has essentially no
effect. I present this matrix because I think it captures well the
situation often created by imperfect law. Sometimes plaintiffs liti-
gate vigorously at the outset of a new law, creating the expectation
that they will do so in the future, causing potential defendants to
play the passive strategy the law intends. But sometimes defen-
dants litigate vigorously at the outset, creating the expectation that
they will do so in the future, causing potential plaintiffs to play the
passive strategy and accept the harm the law intends to deter.
In this setting, however, law's focal power can influence the out-
come. The stability of the existing convention depends on all the
players expecting each other to continue playing the game as be-
fore. But the sanctions the law imposes, while inadequate to create
a dominant strategy of legal compliance, may call into question
whether the individuals are playing the same game as before. Even
ignoring any expressive effect, the sanctions may unsettle existing
expectations enough to cause disequilibrium, requiring an addi-
tional period of learning and adjustment to return to equilibrium.
At that point, either equilibrium could emerge. The final outcome
might be the same as the prior convention-unfettered Landlord
access-but it could be a new limited-entry convention. It is pre-
cisely in this situation of uncertainty that anything making one
outcome focal will create expectations that lead to that outcome.
By highlighting the outcome the law intends, and by telling potential
plaintiffs and defendants that the payoffs are changed for the pur-
pose of changing the equilibrium, the law makes focal the outcome
in which potential plaintiffs play Insist to potential defendants' De-
fer. Like a person standing in the road "waving on" one line of traffic
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and "holding off" another, courts and legislatures may expressively tip
the outcome toward the plaintiff-dominant equilibrium by publicly
"pointing to" that outcome. When sanctions are imperfect, this focal
effect could determine whether the law changes the equilibrium or
has no effect at all."
As with all the claims in this Article, this one is empirical. To de-
fine the claim precisely, it may help to describe a thought
experiment, which is also an outline for an empirical test of the
theory. Suppose we randomly select pairs of players and assign
them the permanent "role" of Row Player-R-or Column
Player-C. For the first experimental stage, we have them play the
game represented in Figure 8." According to the theory, the pairs
will quickly settle into a C-dominant equilibrium (because Cs al-
ways play Insist). For the second experimental stage, we have all
the pairs of players switch to playing the game represented in Fig-
ure 9. But we randomly divide these pairs into two groups. For
Group 1, the experimenters tell the players nothing, or perhaps say
that "random events" have changed the payoffs of the game.
Group 1 is intended to model the effect of the legal sanctions iso-
lated from any expressive effect. For Group 2, however, we tell the
players something intended to model the law's expressive effect.
This might be done in several ways, none of which can perfectly
capture law, but all of which are suggestive of what law does inde-
pendent of its sanctions. The experimenters (or an R-player) might
announce to the players that the change "represents a chance for
Rs to play Insist," or that they "expect the new payoffs to change
the game's outcome." Another possibility would be to have the ex-
47 The same point would apply even if the initial payoffs do create a Hawk-Dove
game. Assume that the original payoffs are those stated in Figure 9 except that for cell
four they are -5, -3. Now the Landlord no longer has a dominant strategy and both
Insist/Defer and Defer/Insist are possible equilibria. Assume, however, that the
convention that emerges is the one where Landlords always play Insist to the Tenant's
Defer (which is actually more likely given the greater fight costs to Tenants). At this
point, imperfect sanctions can have the same effect as is described in the text. They
fail to make legal compliance the necessary outcome (as where the new payoffs for
Insist/Insist are -4, -4), but they may succeed in unsettling the existing equilibrium.
With disequilibrium, the focal effect of law can influence the outcome. In general, the
focal point may matter whether imperfect sanctions create a new Hawk-Dove game
or merely change the payoffs in an existing Hawk-Dove game.
,43 The players interact a number of times and receive monetary units represented
by the payoff numbers in the matrix (but their specific decisions remain anonymous
even from the experimenter).
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perimenters (or an R-player) make a more normative statement
like "we are changing the game because we didn't think the last
one was fair to Rs." Many variations are possible depending on
how far one wants to go toward creating a realistic context for the
players. Whatever the exact details, the focal point theory makes a
definite prediction: that in stage two we will observe an R-
dominant equilibrium emerge in Group 2 significantly more often
than we observe it in Group 1. A publicized third-party statement,
like law, that calls attention to the equilibrium in which Rs play In-
sist, is more likely to produce that equilibrium.
CONCLUSION
Much economics-influenced legal theory views law as a solution
to the problem of cooperation. The result is that law and econom-
ics concerns itself almost exclusively with the sanctions necessary
to solve a cooperation problem. This Article has focused on a dif-
ferent problem of strategic interaction, one that has received too
little attention given how common it is-the problem of coordina-
tion. Sanctions can solve coordination problems, but so can clear,
well-publicized, third-party statements, including the legal pro-
nouncements of judges and legislatures. Independent of its
sanctions, law can make focal one means of coordinating and
thereby induce individuals to select that means. Other third-party
pronouncements can have the same expressive effect, but law often
has the advantage of publicity and uniqueness. These features may
allow even ill-informed government officials to develop a reputa-
tion for predicting future behavior, which in turn further enhances
the law's coordinating power.
Focal points matter not merely to pure coordination games, but
to any game with multiple equilibria, including situations where in-
dividual interests conflict to a substantial degree. My primary
example is the Hawk-Dove game, which plausibly characterizes
many real-world situations in which parties make conflicting claims
but have a common interest in avoiding a "fight," broadly under-
stood to include verbal as well as physical confrontations (and
sometimes to include litigation with an expected negative return).
In these situations, law can expressively change the expectations
about which individual will play the aggressive strategy, and
thereby influence the individuals' actual behavior. Law can work
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on a single pair of individuals by adjudication or on multiple pairs
through regulation.
Focal points also matter to repeated situations because they in-
fluence what convention will emerge over time. Even though
conventions emerge easily without law, and such conventions by
definition enjoy a certain stability, the focal effect matters for sev-
eral reasons. Before any equilibrium arises, or during a new period
of disequilibrium, the law's focal power may influence what con-
vention emerges. Even after a convention emerges, the focal power
of law may change it. By publicizing or clarifying an asymmetry in
the situation, law enables new possible strategies that can lead to
new conventions. More fundamentally, because the stability of a
convention is contingent on the focal power of past precedent, it
remains an empirical question whether any particular convention
can resist the competing focal point provided by a new law. I have
attempted to illustrate these points with examples of traffic regula-
tion, a ban on public smoking, and liability for landlords. In each
case, there is a plausible focal effect independent of the legal sanc-
tions imposed.
My goal in this Article has been to identify the relevance of focal
point analysis to law and begin exploring its potential. Far from
providing an exhaustive treatment, my analysis is preliminary and
incomplete: I consider only a few mixed-motive games, particularly
Hawk-Dove; I mostly ignore the complications created when indi-
viduals have different payoffs or the sort of iterated conditions that
encourage individuals to develop reputations for behaving a cer-
tain way; I do not consider the more recent and complex concepts
of evolutionary equilibria. The analysis I do provide, however,
demonstrates something of the enormous potential for understand-
ing expressive law through the idea of focal points. We may even
understand the role of government differently- not merely to co-
erce, but to guide. I do not claim that this expressive effect is more
important than the law's sanction effect, nor even that the focal
point effect is the most important component of the law's expres-
sive effect. I claim only that this area of game theory provides an
interesting and useful insight into the power of law to influence be-
havior by what it says rather than by what it does. Where the
problem is coordinating expectations, expressive law provides a
possible solution.
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